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1 Introduction 
 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time and one of the most 
important issues our generation and future generations will have to deal with. 
Something is happening. But what that is, cannot be said exactly. The only thing 
we do know is that it has to do with the emissions of certain gases and that the 
consequences could be dire. Noticing and later understanding the problem, led to 
different reactions in the world. For instance the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro 
and the 3rd Conference of the Parties in Kyoto can be seen as milestones in the 
combat against global warming. Nations have reacted (if they reacted at all) quite 
differently to the scientific findings that something had to be done. Chapter 2 gives 
an overview on the topic of global warming and the measures against it. The 
European Union decided (among other measures) to implement a multinational 
emission trading scheme. Organized in phases, it puts a cap on total allowed 
emissions. Offering a fixed supply of emission allowances, rights to emit, the 
system wants to take advantage of the simple economic idea that if the prices are 
high enough the demand will decline. Chapter 3 explains the background of the 
system. Up to now only the first phase has been completed. Intended as a trial 
phase to gain experiences, this phase has motivated many authors to write down 
and interpret the processes and occurrences. I try to evaluate the potential 
success or possible failure of the trading system by analysing the literature. By 
comparing the Member States’ transposition and implementation of the rules and 
regulations from the European Commission and their resulting handling of the 
scheme, Chapter 4 deals with the experiences made during Phase I. During the 
first years many obstacles arose and the Member States had to learn the hard way 
that their emission trading system was not yet perfected. Chapter 5 lists some of 
the problems the participating countries had to face. In the end I give a summary 
on the findings of Phase I and the conclusions I came to when writing this work. 
 
2 Climate Change 
 
”Climate change is one of the greatest, if not the greatest challenge ever faced by 
human society. But it is a challenge that we must confront, for the alternative is a 
-1- 
future that is unpalatable, and potentially unliveable. While it is quite clear that 
inaction will have dire consequences, it is likewise certain that a concerted effort 
on the part of humanity to act in its own best interests has great potential to end in 
success.” (Mann and Kump 2008, p.197). Stern emphasises the importance of fast 
action. “If the world waits before taking the problem seriously, until Bangladesh, 
the Netherlands and Florida are under water, it will be too late to back ourselves 
out of a huge hole. A special challenge of making policy here is that we are fast 
approaching a crisis which requires decision and action now, but we cannot yet 
directly experience the real magnitude of the dangers we are causing. And let us 
be clear, these dangers are on a scale that could cause not only disruption and 
hardship but mass migration and thus conflict on a global scale. They concern us 
all, rich and poor.” (Stern 2009, p.3) 
 
2.1 Overview – Climate Change: Is That Not Good? 
In 1992 the United Nations defined climate change as “a change of climate which 
is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the 
global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed 
over comparable time periods” and emissions as “the release of greenhouse 
gases and/or their precursors into the atmosphere over a specified area and 
period of time.” (United Nations 1992a1, Article 1) 
 
Greenhouse gas emission is a global problem. Wind currents mingle and spread 
the emissions all over the world, making the location of the emission irrelevant. 
A country with tight environmental policies, that uses clean technologies, emits 
very little and serves as a role model in general, still has to deal with climate 
change and emissions. A country with high emissions, on the contrary, profits from 
the emission reductions of cleaner countries. States, who believe that enough is 
being done by others and want to benefit from the measures taken by others, 
underestimate the problem. The global emission levels have to be reduced 
dramatically. Climate change policies are not about reversing the effect, but about 
reducing the speed and maybe stabilizing the rate of climate change.  
                                                     
1 United Nations 1992a furtheron referred to as “UNFCCC” 
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 Atmospheric quality is a global public good, which means that the positive and 
negative influences and impacts it has, cannot be reduced to one country or other 
part of the world, but it affects the whole world. The characteristics of a public 
good are that they are non-rivaled and non-excludable. Non-rivaled means that the 
good can be consumed all the while not reducing the total amount available for 
others. “Non-excludable” means that anyone can benefit from it without 
necessarily having to pay for it, maybe without even knowing that they are 
benefiting from it. As soon as the good is (made) available to one person, it is 
available to all. - The problem with atmospheric quality being a public good is that 
no market exists for these goods. Either they are just there (e.g. air, atmospheric 
quality) or they are provided by the government (e.g. national defence, public 
fireworks). In case of public goods a common market failure is the free-rider 
problem. This is the case when consumers benefit of a good, without making a 
contribution to the good’s maintenance or creation. There are solutions for these 
problems, but as we dealt with a global public good in our case, it does not 
become easier. Nordhaus explains that because “global warming is a global public 
good, the key environmental issue is global emissions, and the key economic 
issue is how to balance costs and benefits of global emissions reductions.” 
(Nordhaus 2007) 
 
Just like the location, the timing of the emissions is of little importance. 
Greenhouse gases have long lifetimes and stay in the atmosphere for several 
decades. It is important to keep the total aggregated volume of emissions in the 
atmosphere at a level the environment can deal with. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) states that “on current trends, energy-related emissions of carbon-
dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases will rise inexorably, pushing up 
average global temperature by as much as 6°C in the long term.” (IEA 2008) Stern 
tries to make a temperature increase on this scale imaginable, when he writes that 
the ”seriousness of a 5°C increase is clear when we realise that in the last ice age, 
around 10.000 years ago, the planet was 5°C cooler than now. Most of Northern 
Europe, North America and corresponding latitudes were under hundreds of 
metres of ice, with human life concentrated much closer to the equator.” (Stern 
2009, p.9) 
-3- 
 2.2 Causes of Global Warming 
The main cause of global warming, climate scientists agree is the emission of 
greenhouse gases, with the combustion of fossil fuels (oil, coal, gas) and 
deforestation being the main, anthropogenic activities responsible.  As shown in 
Figure 1, in 2005 the European Environment Agency (EEA) calculated the sources 
of climate change and found that the power sector was responsible for 28 per cent 
of the greenhouse gas emissions, followed by the transport sector and the 
industrial sector. What might come as a surprise is that households and small 
businesses, as they use energy, are responsible for a staggering 17 per cent of 
the total emissions. Over two thirds of the energy used by households is spent on 
heating homes, the rest is used on heating water, on lighting and on electric 
appliances and travelling by car and by air. 
 
 
Figure 1 Sources of EU greenhouse gas emissions in 2005.2 
 
2.3 Greenhouse Effect 
The atmosphere of the Earth consists of a blanket of different gases. The incoming 
short-wave radiation passes the atmosphere. Outgoing long-wave radiation is 
absorbed by a few gases. The accumulation of these emitted greenhouse gases 
trap the sun’s heat in the atmosphere. This is essential for life. Without this gas 
blanket the Earth would be cold and uninhabitable. The increased rate of emission 
                                                     
2 taken from European Commission (2005a) 
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of greenhouse gases, however, affects this blanket in a way that outgoing 
radiation cannot pass through it anymore. Thus the heat is trapped under the 
blanket and the temperature on Earth rises. With a higher temperature the whole 
climate system is affected. The actual consequences of a climate change are very 
difficult to predict.  
 
Figure 2 shows a conceptual model of the greenhouse effect. 
 
 
Figure 2 The Greenhouse Effect.3 
 
2.3.1 Greenhouse Gases 
Greenhouse gases are trace gases. The UNFCCC defines them as “those 
gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that 
absorb and re-emit infrared radiation,” in their Article 1. The Kyoto Protocol 
identifies six greenhouse gases in its Annex A, that have different impacts on 
                                                     
3 taken from Greenpeace Homepage (2009) 
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global warming: Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide (N2O), 
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphur hexafluoride 
(SF6). (United Nations 19974) 
 
Figure 3 shows their relative importance within the European Union (EU) in 1990 
given in CO2 equivalents. 
 
 
Figure 3 Relative importances of the greenhouse gases within the EU year 1990 – in CO2 
equivalents5 
 
2.3.1.1 Carbon Dioxide  
CO2 is the most important of the greenhouse gases, because of the immense 
quantity in which it is emitted. It accounts for about 82 per cent of the impact of 
total greenhouse gas emissions, when sorting the greenhouse gases by their 
global warming potentials. It is released by combustion of anything that contains 
                                                     
4 United Nations (1997) furtheron referred to as “Kyoto Protocol” 
5 taken from Annex II of European Commission (1999) 
-6- 
carbon, mainly fossil fuels and wood and by respiration of biosphere. The main 
emitter is the energy industry, with the transport sector, which is responsible for 
the recent increase of the emission of this gas, in second place. Also households 
and the manufacturing industries are large CO2 emitters. CO2 can be removed 
from the atmosphere e.g. through absorption by the ocean, through 
photosynthesis, through carbon sinks. 
 
2.3.1.2 Methane  
CH4 is the second most important of the greenhouse gases in terms of quantity, 
accounting for about 8 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions. It is more 
effective in terms of climate-change quality than carbon dioxide, but considering 
the overall quantity cannot keep up with CO2. The main source of methane 
emissions is found to be the agricultural sector (livestock digestive processes and 
manure). It is released by fossil fuel production, pulp and paper processing and 
waste management – any anaerobic decay of matter. Especially coal mining and 
rice paddies are emitting heavily. 
 
2.3.1.3 Nitrous Oxide  
N2O accounts for about 7 per cent of total greenhouse gas emissions and is 
released mainly by the chemical industry, by the agricultural sector’s use of 
fertilizers and in fossil fuel combustion processes. 
 
2.3.1.4 Hydrofluorocarbons and Perfluorocarbons 
Hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons are halocarbons. Halocarbons do not 
exist naturally but are human-produced. They consist of a halogen (fluorine, 
chlorine, bromine, iodine) and carbon. Hydrofluorocarbons are used in huge 
quantities in refrigeration. Perfluorocarbons are a by-product of aluminium 
smelting. 
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2.3.1.5 Sulphur Hexafluoride 
The main emitter of sulphur hexafluoride is the power industry, as it is used to 
insulate high-voltage equipment. Together the fluorinated gases account for about 
1 per cent of total greenhouse gas emission, with a decreasing trend. This may not 
seem a lot, but due to their high global warming potential, they constitute a 
problem. 
 
2.3.2 Greenhouse Gas Equivalents  
For easier comparison of the gases’ climate impact the greenhouse gas 
equivalents were introduced. CO2 was fixed at 1. The other greenhouse gases 
have corresponding values, relative to CO2. These values are called greenhouse 
gas equivalents and depend on the gases’ global warming potentials (GWP). CO2 
equivalents are a universal standard of measurement (like metre or kilogram). The 
GWP is measured in three timescales. The time horizons are 20, 100 and 500 
years. CO2 describes the baseline and always has a value of 1. Article 3 of the 
“Emission Directive”6 defines that “’tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent’ means one 
metric tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2) or an amount of any other greenhouse gas 
listed in Annex II with an equivalent global warming potential.”  
 
The greenhouse gas equivalents (CO2e) are indicated by the gases’ global 
warming potentials and are listed in the table below. 
 
Table 1 Greenhouse gases and their global warming potential7 
Greenhouse gas Abbreviation Global Warming Potential 
Carbon Dioxide CO2 1 
Methane CH4 21 
Nitrous Oxide  N2O 310 
Perfluorocarbons  PFCs 6.500-9.200 
Hydrofluorocarbons HFCs 140-11.700 
Sulphur hexafluoride SF6 23.900-32.600 
 
Table 1 can be read that in a 100 year period the global warming potential of one 
unit of CH4 is 21 times greater than that of one unit of CO2 and the global warming 
                                                     
6 European Parliament (2003) furtheron referred to as „Emission Directive“ 
7 taken from the IPCC Homepage 
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effect of one tonne of N2O will be 310 times greater than that of one tonne of CO2. 
The equivalent values are not absolute numbers. There is uncertainty about how 
long certain gases remain in the atmosphere, but they constitute an average 
educated estimate. 
 
2.3.3 Greenhouse Gas Emission Levels in Europe 
In 1990, the Kyoto base year, the EU was responsible for around 23 per cent of 
global greenhouse gas emissions. Today, the European Union is responsible for 
about 14 per cent of the global greenhouse gas emissions. Figure 4 shows the 
share of greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-27 by main emitting country in 2006. 
Germany and the United Kingdom are the largest emitters, followed by Italy and 
France. This sequence has not changed since 1990. 
 
 
Figure 4 Share of 2006 greenhouse gas emissions in the EU-27 by main emitting country8 
 
In 2008 the International Energy Agency (IEA 2008) ranked the world’s five largest 
emitters of energy-related CO2 that account for about two thirds of the world’s CO2 
emissions: China, the United States, the European Union, India and Russia. 
 
Figure 5 shows the world-wide CO2 emissions in 2009. The world is split into ten 
regions. Darker areas stand for higher emissions, lighter ones for lower emissions. 
The emission levels of developing countries are projected to exceed those of 
industrialised countries by 2020. 
                                                     
8 taken from the EEA Homepage (2009a)  
-9- 
  
Figure 5 World-wide CO2 Emissions in 20099 
 
In 2008 the EEA stated, that over 80 per cent of the greenhouse gas emissions 
were energy-related, “that is, related to the production of electricity and heat, road 
transportation, etc.” and that the average per capita greenhouse gas emission in 
the EU-27 was 10.4 tonnes of CO2e per capita and year (EEA 2008a). 
 
Figure 6 shows a list of the greenhouse gas emissions per capita of EU-27 
Member States for 1990 and 2005. In 2005 the annual total average per capita 
emission level was at 10.5 tonnes of CO2e. Thus, the emissions in the EU are still 
declining. 
                                                     
9 taken from the IEA Homepage (2009) 
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Figure 6 Greenhouse gas emissions per capita of EU-27 Member States for 1990 and 
200510 
 
If this number is compared to India which, Stern writes, “has seen [economic] 
growth of around 8%, yet per capita emissions are still below 2 tonnes CO2e per 
annum” these numbers come into perspective. He proposes that a 2 tonnes CO2e 
per capita and year has to be a worldwide goal (Stern 2009, p.20). 
 
Figure 7 shows the per capita emissions relative to the population in 2000 for 
selected regions, taking into account all Kyoto gases. The total emissions of the 
selected countries and regions are given by the area of each rectangle, i.e. per 
capita emissions times population size. 
                                                     
10 taken from the EEA Hompage (2009b) 
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Figure 7 Per capita emissions relative to population in 200011 
 
2.4 Impacts of Global Warming 
One impact of global warming is the rising of sea levels that threaten coastal 
lowlands (e.g. the Netherlands, Florida and the Bangladesh delta), coastal cities 
and islands (e.g. the Maledives) with flooding. Flooding can cause freshwater 
pollution due to seawater intrusion. 
 
Another (expected) consequence of global warming is the melting of glaciers, 
which can cause floods. Glaciers are used as water resources in some areas and 
if they disappear, life in those areas faces a severe problem, as these resources 
retain water and provide homogenous supply during the entire year. 
 
The warm temperatures in recent times have caused the – once immense – 
Greenland ice sheet to retreat. Should this ice sheet melt completely, the sea 
                                                     
11 taken from Point Carbon (2007a) 
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levels would rise up to seven meters and the Gulf Stream would be affected. The 
Gulf Stream warms north-western Europe. 
 
The number of extreme weather events is rising. Higher maximum temperatures, 
higher risks of droughts and fires, storms, more heat waves, and floods happen 
with increased frequency. This also has a negative effect on agricultural yields, 
with maximum effect in poor countries. Changes of rainfall patters may occur 
changing climate, threatening water resources of the concerned regions. 
 
Another consequence of global warming is mass extinction of species. This will 
occur, when their habitats change too quickly for them to adapt and in that way 
become unliveable. 
 
In 2007 the European Commission communicated that climate change was 
already having pronounced environmental, economic and social impacts. Current 
examples are “lack of snow suffered by European ski resorts” and the 2003 heat 
wave in Europe when 20.000 people in the EU died prematurely from heat stress 
and increased air pollution from ozone. Large-scale forest fires raged in Europe 
and farmers lost over EUR 10 billion in income due to crop damage. (European 
Commission 2007a) 
 
Stern explains, what comes as a surprise for some people, that the “danger from 
climate change lies not only, or even primarily, in heat. Most of the damage is from 
water, or the lack of it: storms, droughts, floods, rising sea levels. The levels of 
warming that we risk would be profoundly damaging for all countries of the world, 
rich and poor. A transformation of the physical geography of the world also 
changes the human geography: where we live, and how we live our lives.” He 
states that “the developing world will be hit earliest and hardest, while the rich 
world has more resources and technologies, and the majority of the responsibility 
for past emissions that have taken us to the very difficult starting point for action. 
The sense of injustice felt intensely and very understandably by the developing 
world is a crucial element in the perception of the equity and thus the feasibility of 
any global deal. A major effort by rich countries to support the adaptation of 
developing nations is a key part of an equitable deal.” (2009, p. 9 and 176) 
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 2.5 Understanding the Problem 
Since climate change has become an issue, there have been several milestones 
in the history of understanding the problem. I would like to name only (some of) 
those, that led to the launching of the European Emissions Trading Scheme. 
 
2.5.1 Earth Summit – Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992 
In Rio de Janeiro from June 3 to June 14, 1992 the Earth Summit took place. At 
this United Nations Conference on Environment and Development the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed. It is 
the first international, legally binding agreement on climate change reduction of 
this size. Its objective is the “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic influence with 
the climate system.” It was agreed, that the world had to work together against 
climate change, but that the burdens each nation had to carry had to be 
differentiated. The Convention entered into force on March 21, 1994.  As of today, 
192 nations have adopted the UNFCCC. 
 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (United 
Nations 1992b12) notes: “In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated 
responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they 
bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the 
pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies 
and financial resources they command.” 
 
2.5.2 3rd Conference of the Parties – Kyoto from 1 to 10 December 1997 
At the 3rd Conference of the Parties the Kyoto Protocol was done. It is an 
international agreement, adopted on December 11, 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, that 
sets legally binding targets for a list of developed countries, originally 38 
                                                     
12 United Nations 1992b furtheron referred to as “Rio Declaration” 
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industrialised countries and the EU-15, for the reduction of a number of 
greenhouse gases. The emission targets presently apply to 37 industrialised 
countries and the EU-15, as the United States have chosen not to ratify the 
Protocol. 
 
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol reads: “The Parties included in Annex I shall, 
individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed 
their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the 
provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such 
gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008-
2012.” (United Nations 199713) 
 
Annex I is an annex of the UNFCCC and lists the parties, developed and 
developing countries, that have agreed to limit their anthropogenic emissions. In 
1990 the Annex I nations were responsible for around 64 per cent of the 
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. Annex I parties are Australia, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Monaco, The 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of 
America. Among the Annex I countries only the United States of America have not 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
Non-Annex I countries, are (mainly developing) countries, that have ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol, but which have no emission targets. 
 
Annex B is an annex of the Kyoto Protocol, in which Kyoto’s 5 per cent emission 
limitation level is assigned and redistributed to 39 Annex I countries, which have 
ratified the Protocol and which were considered to be industrialised countries in 
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1992 (established at the negotiation of UNFCCC). Annex B parties are the same 
as Annex I except Belarus, Turkey and the United States of America. The 
countries listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol have differentiated emission 
reduction targets.  
 
Annex A is an annex of the Kyoto Protocol that lists the greenhouse gases and the 
sectors/source categories. 
 
By signing the Kyoto Protocol developed countries agreed to lower their 
greenhouse gas emissions by on average 5.2 per cent below the 1990 emission 
levels between 2008 and 2012. This five-year time horizon was chosen – rather 
than a deadline – to smooth out unforeseeable emission fluctuations due to e.g. 
weather, volcanic eruptions, or political happenings (e.g. war). The European 
Community, which ratified the Kyoto Protocol on May 31, 2002 and signed the 
Protocol as one party, has committed itself to reducing its overall greenhouse gas 
emissions by 8 per cent during the compliance period. - As of May 2009, 184 
countries have ratified the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations 2009). 
 
Table 2 shows the targets the Annex I countries agreed to. 
 
To reach the targets the countries agreed upon, the Kyoto Protocol suggests 
national measures but additionally offers three flexible mechanisms, sometimes 
called “flexmex”, to mitigate the greenhouse gases: joint implementation (JI), clean 
development mechanisms (CDM) and emission trading. 
 
Article 25 of the Kyoto Protocol stipulates that the “Protocol shall enter into force 
on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the 
Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for 
at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties 
included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.” This condition was finally met when the Russian 
Federation, who is responsible for 17.4 per cent of the emissions, ratified the 
Protocol on November 18, 2004. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol, the international 
reaction to climate change, finally came into force on February 16, 2005 with the 
-16- 
agreement of 141 countries. Should a party fail to meet its Kyoto target, it has to 
compensate for the difference, increased by a 30 percent penalty, in the 
subsequent commitment period, starting 2013. 
 
Table 2 Emission reduction targets of Annex I Parties. 
Annex I Party Emission Limitation
Belarus, Turkey Party for which 
there is a specific 
COP and/or CMP 
decision 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
European Community, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, 
Monaco, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland 
 
-8% 
United States of America -7% 
Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland -6% 
Croatia -5% 
New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine 0% 
Norway +1% 
Australia +8% 
Iceland +10% 
 
In 2008 the EEA calculated the projections of the emission levels of the states 
participating in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and 
compared them to the individual targets.  
 
As visible Figure 8, some states will have problems reaching their Kyoto target, if 
further measures are not taken (EEA 2008a). 
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Figure 8 Gaps between EU Kyoto and burden-sharing targets and projections for 2010. 
 
The costs of the implementation of the Kyoto targets vary, depending on the 
estimates. In 2002 the European Commission estimated that “the total compliance 
costs of meeting the Kyoto Protocol targets can be as low as 0.06% of EU 
projected GDP [gross domestic product] in 2010, if the EU adopts the most 
efficient policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.” (European Commission 
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2002) The “Green Paper” states, “Estimates show that Community-wide trading by 
energy producers and energy intensive industry could reduce the costs of 
implementing the Community’s Kyoto commitments by nearly a fifth compared with 
separate Member State schemes that did not allow for cross-border trading. This 
represents a potential cost saving of approximately EUR 1.7 billion per year.” 
(European Commission 200014) In 2005 the European Commission recalculated 
the figures and had to make corrections. It now estimated that “the scheme should 
allow the EU to achieve its Kyoto target at a cost of between EUR 2.9 billion and 
EUR 3.7 billion annually. This is less than 0.1% of the EU’s GDP. Without the 
scheme, compliance costs could reach up to EUR 6.8 billion a year.” (European 
Commission 2005b) In 2007 the European Commission issued a Memo on climate 
change, in which it writes that the ”Commission's impact assessment shows that 
taking action to limit climate change is fully compatible with sustaining global 
economic growth. Investment in a low-carbon economy will require around 0.5 % 
of total global GDP over the period 2013–2030. This would reduce global GDP 
growth by just 0.19 % per year up to 2030, a fraction of the expected annual GDP 
growth rate of 2.8%, and this is without taking into account associated health 
benefits, greater energy security and reduced damage from avoided climate 
change. This is a small insurance premium to pay for significantly reducing the risk 
of irreversible damage, particularly when compared with the Stern Review's 
estimate that uncontrolled climate change will cost between 5 and 20% of GDP in 
the longer term.” (European Commission 2007b). 
 
2.5.3 EU Burden Sharing Agreement of April 25, 2002 
Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol allows that the European Community, whose 
Member States have signed the Protocol individually but that has also signed as 
one party, can redistribute its overall 8 per cent target between its Member States 
as long as the outcome stays the same. It is often referred to as a “bubble” that is 
put over the participating states. The states under the “bubble” have agreed to a 
common goal, to reduce their emissions by 8 per cent, and that it was unimportant 
who underneath that bubble exactly reduced how much, as long as the overall 
goal was reached. Each Member State is allotted an individual target, for which it 
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is then individually responsible, with the target of the bubble playing only a role in 
aggregated form. De Sepibus explains, “The idea of burden sharing can be traced 
back to the elaboration of the EU negotiating position in preparation for the third 
Conference of the Parties (COP3) in December 1997 in Kyoto, at which the Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted. The EU bubble was found necessary to allow the 
Community to adopt a common negotiating position for a challenging target under 
the Kyoto Protocol.” (de Sepibus 2007a) 
 
As mentioned above the Rio Declaration calls for “common but differentiated 
responsibilities”. To take into account the characteristics and economic 
possibilities of the Member States the EU “Burden Sharing Agreement” was 
reached on 17 June 1998 at a meeting of the Environment Council (European 
Commission 1999). In this so-called “Bubble Agreement” the individual targets of 
the Member States of the EU, then EU-15, were politically agreed upon. The 
overall emission reduction target of 8 percent was split between the Member 
States, to give poorer countries lighter burdens compared to richer Member 
States, i.e. the Kyoto target was differentiated into national goals for each Member 
State. 
 
Annex I of the Communication on the Burden Sharing agreement lists the 
countries and their reduction targets, in percentile and in absolute terms, as shown 
in Table 3. 
 
On March 2, 2002 the individual targets of the EU Member States were agreed in 
legally binding form and came into force on April 25, 2002 by Council Decision 
(European Council 2002). 
 
According to their Kyoto Protocol targets the countries can issue Kyoto emission 
permit units, so called assigned amount units (AAUs), up to their compliance level. 
Issuing refers to the creation of the AAUs. The total of AAUs issued forms the 
country’s emission budget. Emission trading redistributes the AAUs. The overall 
amount stays the same. One AAU permits the emission of one tonne of CO2e.  
The EU ETS Member States allocate, i.e. distribute, European Union Allowances 
(EUAs), by taking the according number of AAUs from their national emission 
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budget, transforming them into EUAs which are then allocated to sectors and 
further on to companies and installations in the allocation process as put down in 
the National Allocation Plans (NAPs). One EUA permits the holder of the 
certificate to emit one tonne of CO2e. 
 
Table 3 Individual targets of the EU-1515 
 Burden sharing in % Burden sharing in Mt CO2e
Austria -13% 64 
Belgium -7.5% 129 
Denmark -21% 57 
Finland 0% 73 
France 0% 637 
Germany -21% 949 
Greece +25% 130 
Ireland +13% 64 
Italy -6.5% 506 
Luxemburg -28% 10 
Netherlands, The -6% 196 
Portugal +27% 87 
Spain  +15% 347 
Sweden +4% 72 
United Kingdom -12.5% 678 
European Community -8% 3998 
 
2.5.4 Emission Directive 
Stern explains that there “are, broadly speaking, three policy instruments that can 
be used to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions: a tax, in which case the price 
is determined by the level of the tax; trading of a fixed number of emission permits, 
the number and initial allocation of which is set by the government – in which case 
the price is set by the interaction of buyers and sellers in the market; and 
regulations or technical requirements which may need more costly equipment or 
processes – the implicit price is then the extra cost divided by emissions saved.” 
(Stern 2009, p.102) After the Kyoto Protocol negotiations in December 1997, the 
European Commission issued a communication, introducing the idea of EU-wide 
emission trading (European Commission 1998).  
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 In March 2000 the European Commission published the “Green Paper on 
greenhouse gas emissions trading within the European Union”, which suggests 
international emission trading as the preferable measure towards Kyoto 
compliance as it gives companies more flexibility in reaching their targets. 
“Emission trading, whether domestic or international is a scheme whereby entities 
such as companies are allocated allowances for their emissions. Companies that 
reduce their emissions by more than their allocated allowance can sell their 
“surplus” to others who are not able to reach their target so easily. This trading 
does not undermine the environmental objective, since the overall amount of 
allowances is fixed. Rather, it enables cost-effective implementation of the overall 
target and provides incentives to invest in environmentally sound technologies.” 
Proposing emission trading as the measure of choice was a surprising step, since 
up to then the European Commission had preferred regulatory measures to 
market-based instruments. In June 2000 the EU started its European Climate 
Change Program (ECCP) to find solutions for and to give recommendations how 
to deal with the climate change problem in a cost-efficient way. The results – 
among which was a framework of an Emission Directive – were presented to the 
European Commission. In October 2001 the Proposal of an Emission Directive 
was finally accepted and published by the European Commission (European 
Parliament 2001). The trading proposal was presented, in a first reading in the 
European Parliament, by the European Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council of Environmental Ministers, who proposed several further 
amendments. In July 2003, after the proposed amendments had been negotiated, 
the Emission Directive was agreed on in a second reading. On July 22, 2003 the 
Council and the European Parliament finalized the text of the Emission Directive. 
On October 13, 2003, after the approval of all (then) 15 EU Member States and 
the European Parliament, the European Parliament and the Council established a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community in 
their “Emission Directive16”, Directive 2003/87/EC, which came into force on 
October 25, 2003. 
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Ellerman explains “the ETS Directive, which provides the legal basis for the EU 
ETS, can be seen, like all EU directives, as a specialized multi-national agreement 
within the broader framework of the Treaties that have established the European 
Union. Although surely different in many particulars, a global trading regime will 
exhibit a similar high degree of decentralization.” (Ellerman 2008) 
 
On January 1, 2005 the EU ETS was launched. The reason for this date was 
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, which reads: “Each Party included in Annex I shall, 
by 2005, have made demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments under 
this Protocol.” The European Commission then decided that “the Community could 
set up its own internal trading regime by 2005” in 1998. (European Commission 
1998) 
 
3 European Union Emission Trading Scheme 
 
Pizer writes, a “global externality requires global cooperation, international 
emissions trading lowers costs for all nations, and emission pricing is the key to 
the development of new climate-friendly technologies.” (Pizer 2006) As the price is 
a function of supply and demand and thus left to the market forces the ETS can be 
seen as an economic policy that enables the Kyoto targets to be reached cost-
effectively. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol reads that Annex B countries “may 
participate in emission trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments […].” 
Ellerman explains that the “EU ETS was conceived in the late 1990s as a means 
of ensuring that the then fifteen members of the European Union (EU15) could 
meet their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol in the First Commitment Period 
(2008-2012).” (Ellerman 2008) 
 
Originally planned as a voluntary measure, the learning phase was planned to 
assist EU countries in reaching their Kyoto targets. By 2002 the emission trends 
showed that several EU countries would miss their targets. Consequently the EU 
then changed the voluntary into a mandatory measure. 
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3.1.1 Main Characteristics of the EU ETS 
Buchner et al. explain, “The EU ETS is basically a mandatory system, with binding 
rules, central monitoring and administrative experts. However, despite the 
hierarchical character of the system, national control over cap setting gave it 
fundamental decentralized character compared, for example, to the US SO2 
[sulphur dioxide] and NOx [nitrogen oxides] trading system.” (Buchner et al. 2007) 
 
In Article 1 of the “Emission Directive” it says the aim of the EU ETS is to help the 
participating countries reach their Kyoto targets during 2008-2012 at minimum 
cost, “to promote reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in a cost-effective and 
economically efficient manner.” It does not suggest new environmental targets. 
 
The EU ETS is organized in phases. Phase I is from 2005-2007 and often referred 
to as “learning phase”, “warm up phase”, “pilot phase” or “trial period”. Phase II 
lasts from 2008 to 2012 and is called “compliance phase” or “Kyoto phase”. Phase 
I was launched to avoid a shock during the compliance phase. It was argued that a 
new market of that dimension would not work from one day to the other and that 
the price building process would need some time. Also the issue of sudden 
emission reductions was identified as a potential problem source. Phase I was 
seen as a possibility to gain experience with the new market and an option to 
assist the participating member states, the “trading states”, reach their imposed 
Kyoto targets and to give them the chance to familiarize themselves with the EU 
ETS and the idea of emission limits, in other words, by offering a “learning by 
doing” period. The “Green Paper”, published in 2000, points out the necessity of 
the learning phase: “As emission trading is a new instrument for environmental 
protection within the EU, it is important to gain experience in its implementation 
before the international emission trading scheme starts in 2008.” 
 
The EU ETS takes place on the level of installations. Article 3 of the “Emission 
Directive” defines an installation as “a stationary technical unit where one or more 
activities listed in Annex I are carried out.” 
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3.1.2 Cap-and-Trade System 
The cap-and-trade system was considered rather late as the instrument of choice 
against climate change, in Europe. Up to then the long-standing command-and-
control policies were the mainly used measures. The kick-off to use a cap-and-
trade system in the context of environmental policies was given by the United 
States (US) during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol’s climate change 
policies. The US had a (working) SO2 allowance system, which is a tradable permit 
system that started in 1990 as a product of the Clean Air Act Amendments and 
covers SO2 and N2O emissions. Former US president Bill Clinton requested the 
use of this flexible market-based instrument, while Europe suggested a command-
and-control policy. In the end, Europe reluctantly accepted the US proposal. 
Former US president George Bush followed Bill Clinton’s term of office, in January 
2001, with entirely different views on environmental policies. In March 2001 the 
US, at that time responsible for about one third of the world’s greenhouse gas 
emissions and thus the biggest emitter of greenhouse gases, surprisingly backed 
out of the Kyoto Protocol, delaying its entering into force for an until then unknown 
time period.  
 
Still, the EU ETS, as we know it today, a cap-and-trade system, was kept and has 
advanced to the largest, mandatory, multinational market for CO2 in the world 
within a few years. The EU ETS is a product of the Kyoto Protocol, but still by now 
it is quite independent of it. Of the 184 countries that have ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, only 27 countries, 14.7 per cent, participate in the scheme, in 2008 three 
non-EU-countries join in, increasing this percentage to 16.3 per cent. 
 
The EU ETS Member States had to transpose the “Emission Directive” – another 
consequence of the Kyoto Protocol – into national law by December 31, 2003. At 
that time it was unclear when and unlikely if the Kyoto Protocol would come into 
force at all, with the US, then the world’s largest emitter – in 2006 overtaken by 
China as largest emitter – having declared that it would not ratify. By laying down 
the EU ETS in EU law, the Kyoto Protocol itself became unnecessary for this 
particular environmental policy. The Kyoto Protocol considers the time period until 
2012, while the EU ETS is planned to continue with at least another phase, Phase 
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III from 2013-2020. On January 1, 2005, the EU ETS was launched independent 
of the Kyoto Protocol, which did not come into force until February 16, 2005, 
thanks to the Russian Federation that ratified the Protocol 90 days before. 
 
From the environmental point of view, the advantage of a cap-and-trade system 
over a control-and-command system is the emission ceiling, the target level, the 
cap. A certain amount of emission allowances is available, but not more. By 
setting a cap an emission reduction target can be reached exactly, thus the 
environmental outcome is known from the beginning. Other regulatory measures 
cannot ensure that a target will be reached as there are many uncertainties, e.g. 
number of new plants, technologies used,… - In case of taxes the companies emit 
at will and then pay the taxes for their emissions. The tax revenues can be used 
for other environmental policies, but the total emission level of a country cannot be 
controlled. - On January 1, 2005 the quantitative limit on greenhouse gas 
emissions, the cap, became obligatory for the trading partners of the EU ETS. 
 
From the economic point of view, the advantage of a cap-and-trade system is the 
market for the emission allowances, the trade. A company receives a certain 
amount of emission allowances in the beginning of the trading period. These 
allowances have a certain value on the carbon market. The company now has two 
choices. It can keep and use the allowances for itself or it can sell them to other 
companies. If the company does not need as many allowances as it received, or if 
the company estimates that it is cheaper to reduce its emissions and sell the 
surplus allowances, it can do so on the market, making additional profits. The 
investment decisions a company faces are described in Chapter 4.7. If the 
company does not have sufficient allowances and emission reductions are not 
reasonably feasible, it can buy additional allowances on the market, from 
companies with inexpensive mitigation options, thus optimising the cost-efficiency 
of the system. 
 
The macro cap-setting, the overall cap for each country, as Convery et al. explain 
“was achieved in a decentralized, negotiated process between the Commission 
and Member State governments that reflected the political structure of the 
European Union. The “micro” aspects of allocation could best be characterized as 
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an extended industry-government discussion dictated by data availability and the 
ETS mandate to distribute at least 95% of allowances to installations for free.” 
(Convery et al. 2008) 
 
3.1.3 Scope: Greenhouse Gases, Sectors, Installations 
The EU ETS covers the CO2 emissions. No other greenhouse gases are covered 
by the scheme yet.  
 
 
Figure 9 Percentages of emitted greenhouse gases17 
 
As can be seen in Figure 9 CO2 is responsible for the major share of the 
greenhouse gases emitted. 
 
The reason for not including the other five greenhouse gases the Kyoto Protocol 
names, right from the start, is mainly simplicity. Since experience with emission 
trading still has to be built up, authorities want to keep the scheme as simple as 
possible. It is likely that other greenhouse gases will be included later, but the 
initial focus is on CO2. Covering other greenhouse gases by the EU ETS would 
certainly have a positive effect on the market as a whole, as one can assume 
liquidity to increase with more gases covered and the market broadened. This in 
turn can lead to higher market efficiency. 
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Annex I of the “Emission Directive” lists the energy-intensive, key industrial sectors 
that are obliged to participate. Covered under the scheme are the energy sector, 
the metals sector, the minerals sector and other sectors making pulp and paper. 
Table 4 lists the sectors and their corresponding thresholds that are covered by 
the EU ETS. The 20 Megawatt-threshold refers to all aggregated on-site 
combustion activities. 
 
Table 4 Scope: Sectors and thresholds18 
Energy activities 
Combustion installations with a rated thermal input exceeding 20 MW (except 
hazardous or municipal waste installations) 
Mineral oil refineries 
coke ovens 
 
Production and processing of ferrous metals 
Metal ore (including sulphide ore) roasting or sintering installations 
Installations for the production of pig iron or steel (primary or secondary fusion) 
including continuous casting, with a capacity exceeding 2.5 tonnes per hour 
 
Mineral industry 
Installations for the production of cement clinker in rotary kilns with a production 
capacity exceeding 500 tonnes per day or lime in rotary kilns with a production 
capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day or in other furnaces with a production capacity 
exceeding 50 tonnes per day 
Installations for the manufacture of glass including glass fibre with a melting capacity 
exceeding 20 tonnes per day 
Installations for the manufacture of ceramic products by firing, in particular roofing 
tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware or porcelain, with a production 
capacity exceeding 75 tonnes per day, and/or with a kiln capacity exceeding 4 m3 
and with a setting density per kiln exceeding 300 kg/m3 
 
Other activities 
Industrial plants for the production of 
(a) pulp from timber or other fibrous materials 
(b) paper and board with a production capacity exceeding 20 tonnes per day 
 
As with the gases, it is likely that other sectors will be included in the scheme at 
later times.  
 
Bleischwitz et al. explain that the “energy-intensive sectors have not been included 
in general because they are energy users rather than producers, e.g. the chemical 
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sector, waste incineration, aluminium and other metal industries are not included.” 
(Bleischwitz et.al. 2007) One reason for this is the polluter pays principle, which 
suggests charging the original emitter, which would be the energy producer. Non-
covered sectors face other national environmental regulations and the possibility 
of loading a double burden on the companies is given. This has a negative effect 
on the competition, which is higher in the energy-intensive industries than is in the 
energy-producing industry that hardly has to deal with any competition due to their 
grid monopolies. A second reason could be that the emissions coming from these 
installations are relatively small compared to the number of installations. Including 
them in the scheme would require a great deal of additional administrative 
expenditure and was not considered reasonable during the learning phase. 
 
During Phase I around 12.000 installations were covered by the EU ETS in the 25 
(27 with Bulgaria and Romania participating from 2007) Member States. This 
number varied during Phase I (as it is varying in Phase II), due to plant closures 
and new entrants. Together these installations are responsible for about 45 per 
cent of the EU’s total CO2 emissions, corresponding to about 30 per cent of EU’s 
total greenhouse gas emissions. About two thirds of the installations covered are 
combustion installations, accounting for 72 per cent of total CO2 emissions (of the 
installations participating in the EU ETS). 
 
Member States can choose to opt-in. During Phase I opt-ins are limited to 
installations, that are listed in Annex I of the “Emission Directive”, but do not reach 
the threshold, that automatically includes them in the EU ETS, i.e. the installations 
are too small to automatically fall under the scheme and thus are left a choice 
whether they want to participate or not. During Phase II the scope for opt-ins is 
broadened. Member States can now additionally opt-in greenhouse gases and 
installations not listed in the “Emission Directive”. - An installation will voluntarily 
opt-in to the EU ETS if participating has monetary advantages. If compliance is 
cheaper when an installation is part of the scheme, it will enter. If an installation’s 
compliance costs are lower outside the EU ETS, it will choose not to participate. 
 
Under certain circumstances installations can “opt-out” during Phase I, opt-outs in 
Phase II are prohibited. Opting-out refers to not participating in the scheme by 
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choice even though the installation would be covered by the scheme. An opt-out 
has to be accepted by the European Commission and is only possible if the 
installation faces similar monitoring and reporting rules as it would under the EU 
ETS. 
 
3.1.4 Linkage: Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanisms 
Linkage refers to the use of system-foreign credits to ensure compliance. In case 
of the EU ETS it relates to any non-EUA credit. 
 
As stated before, the Kyoto Protocol suggests three flexible mechanisms to 
mitigate the greenhouse gases: emission trading (Article 17) as well as joint 
implementation (Article 6) and clean development mechanisms (Article 12). The 
EU ETS, which is a product of Article 17, wants to take advantage of the other two, 
project-based, flexible mechanisms to further lower the costs of emission 
reduction. Since the location of the emission reduction is globally irrelevant, these 
mechanisms allow a reduction in other countries that allow for a cheaper 
mitigation. Also the “Emission Directive”, in favour of further linkage of the EU ETS 
with other emission trading schemes suggests in its Article 25, “agreements 
should be concluded with third countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol 
which have ratified the Protocol to provide for a mutual recognition of allowances 
between the Community scheme and other greenhouse gas emission trading 
schemes […].” This means, that one condition for countries to issue CERs or 
ERUs is the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Only countries that have ratified, 
may issue Kyoto emission credits. 
 
Apart from the obvious advantage of further cost reduction if the trading scheme is 
linked to CDM and JI, another benefit is the broadened market. This has a positive 
effect for all market participants. Especially the smaller players have an 
advantage, since the market power of the big players is reduced as the market is 
expanded. In a broader market price does not react as strongly as in a smaller 
market, thus price volatility is lessened by linking the schemes. Another advantage 
is that by including developing countries in climate change projects, a step towards 
international collaboration is taken. Obviously it is too early – and maybe it will 
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never be possible at all – to extend the system to one global emissions trading 
scheme, but not allowing any linkage may be the wrong approach as experiences 
and system requirements should be shared to motivate and assist other countries. 
 
One disadvantage of linking is the considerable administrational costs of 
assessing and monitoring the projects. The approval process of these projects is 
very complex. It has to be proven, that additional emission savings relative to 
business-as-usual developments – estimated trends if no changes to current 
behaviour are made – will occur through a certain project; savings, that would not 
take place without the project. This additionality criterion is the heart of the 
approval process and its Achilles heel. 
 
Stern sees the future of the combat against climate change in international 
emissions trading. Aware of the problems of an additionality criterion he writes, 
“[…] the worry is that the price will be too low if international trading is opened up 
and thus domestic incentives to cut back will be blunted. The answer to this 
question, surely, is not to curtail the opportunity to lower the costs of reductions via 
trade, but to raise the ambitions and get more reductions for the money. […] The 
answer is to commit to 30% reductions and to more trade. It would not only 
achieve more, it makes it more likely that other countries will set their sights higher 
as part of a global deal.” (Stern 2009, p.163) By limiting the amount of Certified 
Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) that may be 
used – instead of EUAs –, a flooding of the market with credits which would result 
in its breakdown, can be prevented. Stern further argues that profits from selling 
additional credits will decrease and by 2050 will be smaller than now, “because by 
then most countries will, we hope, have taken significant action and there will be 
fewer cheap abatement opportunities to sell. In this sense we would expect the 
volume of trade to rise over the next twenty years or so, and then start to fall. That 
would be a feature of success.” (Stern 2009, p.164) 
 
The additionality criterion is estimated in a baseline process that compares the 
business-as-usual scenario and the scenario with realization of the project in 
question. Credits are only issued for the additional emission reductions. As there is 
a lot of money involved host countries are tempted to declare high business-as-
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usual emissions, in order to increase the additional savings they can sell. A larger 
supply of credits would weigh heavy on their prices and maybe jeopardize the 
whole functionality of the EU ETS. Article 10 of the “Linking Directive19” requires: 
“In order to avoid double counting, CERs and ERUs should not be issued as a 
result of project activities undertaken within the Community that also lead to a 
reduction in, or limitation of, emissions from installations covered by Directive 
2003/87/EC, unless an equal number of allowances is cancelled from the registry 
of the Member State of the CER’s or ERU’s origin.” Only after the approval 
process certificates are generated for the surplus of emission reductions.  
 
On July 23, 2003 a Proposal for a Linking Directive was issued by the European 
Commission (European Parliament 2003b). On September 15, 2004, after a long 
negotiation process, the “Linking Directive”, an amendment to the “Emission 
Directive”, was adopted by the foreign ministers of the EU. It broadens the 
possibilities of the EU ETS, increasing its cost efficiency by linking the EU ETS 
with Kyoto’s flexible mechanisms, CDM and JI. 
 
Article 5 of the “Linking Directive” states: “Member States may allow operators to 
use, in the Community scheme, CERs from 2005 and ERUs from 2008. The use of 
CERs and ERUs by operators from 2008 may be allowed up to a percentage of 
the allocation to each installation, to be specified by each Member State in its 
national allocation plan.”  This percentage has to be consistent with the Member 
State’s Kyoto targets. This means that companies can return a certain number of 
CERs (CDM credits) from 2005 on and a certain number of CERs as well as ERUs 
(JI credits) from 2008 instead of EUAs at the end of the compliance period. The 
Linking Directive restricts the percentage of CERs and ERUs that may be used as 
well as the projects that can yield CERs and ERUs. - The Member State making 
use of these credits has to stay on its Kyoto path. To ensure a reasonable 
percentage, the European Commission ordered that the percentage had to be 
stated in the National Allocation Plan starting from Phase II. Each Member State 
requires different amounts of these credits. 
 
                                                     
19 European Parliament (2004) furtheron referred to as “Linking Directive” 
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Through the “Linking Directive” the “Emission Directive” was amended by further 
restrictions regarding the projects that can generate allowances. In Article 11a it 
now reads: “[…] Member states are to refrain from using CERs and ERUs 
generated from nuclear facilities […] and […] from land use, land use change and 
forestry activities.” The demand for these certificates is high.  
 
3.1.4.1 Clean Development Mechanism 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol allows for CDM, a project-based flexible 
mechanism, that enables Annex I countries to generate additional emission credits 
by conducting environmental projects in non-Annex I countries. - Non-Annex B 
countries or Non-Annex I to the UNFCCC countries are developing countries that 
have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, but do not have legally binding greenhouse gas 
emissions limitations.  
 
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol states, the “purpose of the clean development 
mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving 
sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the 
Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with 
their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments […].” This means 
that apart from overall emission reduction, CDM projects have the positive side-
effect of assisting the developing countries to press ahead with their development, 
as they “will benefit from project activities resulting in certified emission reduction.” 
 
Disadvantages of the CDM credits are their long lead times. It can take years from 
the project initiation to the actual credit issuance. Only projects initiated after 2000 
are eligible. 
 
The project approval procedure is supervised by the CDM Executive Board, which 
manages the validation and issuance process of CERs. 
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3.1.4.2 Joint Implementation 
Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol allows for JI, a project-based flexible mechanism, 
that enables Annex I countries – under certain circumstances also listed in Article 
6 of the Protocol – to generate emission credits by conducting environmental 
projects in other Annex I countries. It states that any Annex I country “may transfer 
to, or acquire from, any other such Party [Annex I country] emission reduction 
units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by 
sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in 
any sector of the economy […].” 
 
One crucial difference between CDM credits and JI credits is that since the Annex 
I countries have greenhouse gas emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol and 
thus a national emission budget of their own, the AAU budget, ERUs (JI credits) 
cannot be produced endlessly. If that were not the case the market would be 
flooded with credits, that way ruining any scarcity, which is, obviously, a necessity 
to keep the market working. Thus, the host country can issue ERUs, but in turn 
has to deduct the emission quantity pendant from its own national emission 
budget. The ERUs are then transferred to the purchasing country. That way the 
overall emission level remains the same, only the location where the emission 
takes place is a different one, i.e. the permission to emit is solemnly redistributed 
to a different country. Opposed to JI, CDM creates new Kyoto credits, i.e. on a 
whole an overall higher emission level is allowed since additional emission permits 
are made available. 
 
3.2 Transposition and Implementation 
The “Emission Directive” required the Member States “to bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive 
by 31 December 2003 at the latest.” This means, that all participating countries 
had to transpose the “Emission Directive” in national law by December 31, 2003. 
The Member States had to be notified of all legislative measures taken by any 
Member State concerning the compliance with the “Emission Directive”. Alas, the 
december-2003-deadline was too tight. In the beginning of 2004 the European 
Commission sent first written warnings to all (then EU-15) States. 
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 Ellerman and Joskow explain that an EU Directive is only a framework “that has to 
be given legal force and implementation through a process called transposition, 
which requires member states to issue legislative and regulatory measures to 
implement the directive within each national jurisdiction.” (Ellerman and Joskow 
2008) 
 
Excursus: Decision making on EU level: 
There are mainly three institutions involved in decision-making on European 
Union level: the European Commission, the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers. 
 
In case of environmental decisions, legislation is adopted by the Council of 
Ministers, the 27 representatives of the discussed field of each EU Member 
State, and the European Parliament, 785 deputies from all Member States, 
that are elected directly. The European Commission’s role is, on the one 
hand, proposing new legislation, and on the other hand, the supervision of 
the correct transposition and implementation of the decided legislation. 
 
In most cases, EU legislation starts with the European Commission issuing 
a Green Paper. The purpose of the Green Paper is mainly to give an 
incentive to start to consider possible improvements and to introduce a new 
topic for debates. Once the discussions on a certain topic are on-going, the 
European Commission issues a White Paper, taking into account the views 
and comments of the interested parties. The White Paper is an 
announcement for proposals to come. Next, the European Commission 
makes a proposal. The proposal is sent to the Council that consults the 
Parliament. The Parliament can approve, reject or ask for amendments of 
the proposal. If the latter is the case, the Commission has to consider the 
suggested amendments. If the Commission accepts the proposed changes, 
it again has to send the now amended proposal to the Council, that again 
consults the Parliament,… The Council and the European Parliament co-
decide on each proposal. It is voted on in the European Parliament and – if 
no veto is made – adopted. 
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 There are different sorts of EU legislation: directive, regulation and decision.  
A directive ”adopted by the Council in conjunction with the European 
Parliament or by the Commission alone, […] is addressed to the Member 
States. Its main purpose is to align national legislation. A “directive” is 
binding on the Member States as to the result to be achieved but leaves 
them the choice of the form and method they adopt to realise the 
Community objectives within the framework of their internal legal order.” 
(European Commission Homepage 2009) A directive has to be transposed 
into national law after its adoption by a given date, but gives the Member 
States a certain freedom of how the set objectives are to be reached. The 
transposition can take several years. A “regulation” is stricter. It leaves no 
choice on how it is to be implemented, but simply enters into force on a 
fixed day, in all Member States. A “decision” is like a regulation, with the 
difference, that it does not concern the Member State as a whole, but 
solemnly those directly addressed in the decision. 
 
3.3 Allocation Process  
Kruger et al. explain that “in establishing the permit market, the authority makes 
three fundamental decisions. First, it defines who will participate in the market – 
the sources of emissions that can buy and sell permits. This effectively determines 
demand in the permit market, since the demand curve is the horizontal summation 
of the demand curves of the individual sources. Second, when the authority 
specifies the cap, it sets the supply in the market because this determines the 
number of permits that will be available. Third, it sets the market in motion by 
allocating the permits among the sources.” (Kruger et al. 2007) Under the EU ETS 
this authority is the European Commission. It gives the Member States a lot of 
freedom on how it intends to allocate the emission allowances, but can take 
influence by rejecting (parts of) the NAPs. 
 
The allocation process contains several steps. First a NAP has to be developed by 
the Member State. Then it has to be submitted to the European Commission for 
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approval. After the approval the allowances can be issued to the installations 
according to the NAP. 
 
3.3.1 Development of the National Allocation Plan 
As a step A, each Member State has to develop a NAP that determines the total 
quantity  of EUAs the Member State intends to allocate to which sectors (macro 
allocation) and, in more detail, to which companies (micro allocation) for a certain 
commitment period. Furthermore it has to contain a list of installations included in 
the EU ETS, the allocation methods used for each installation and the treatment of 
new entrants.  
 
For each trading period an individual NAP has to be prepared. The first trading 
period is 2005-2007, the second one 2008-2012. A third one will follow 2013-2020. 
 
To assist the Member States with the development of their NAPs, the Non Paper 
was published in April 2003. It was not intended as a guidance paper, but mainly 
“discusses the implementation of Annex III criteria […].” (European Commission 
200320) The Non Paper suggests that the process of establishing a national 
allocation plan should contain six steps. The first step should be a top-down, 
economy-wide analysis to define the share of total allowable emissions under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The second step should be a bottom-up exercise of data collection 
on installation level. In a third step the data gained from step one and two should 
be compared and consolidated. In the fourth step the amount of allowances a 
Member State intends to allocate to a certain sector should be calculated. Step 
five calls the attention to new entrants. In a final step the Member State is asked to 
summarise its work and make a draft of the NAP. 
 
To help the Member States with the development of their NAPs the European 
Commission published a Guidance Paper in January 2004, composed of a series 
of guidelines, rules and suggestions that the NAPs have to abide to. The deadline 
of submission and publication of the NAPs to the European Commission for the 
                                                     
20 European Commission 2003 furtheron referred to as “Non Paper” 
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first trading period was March 31, 2004. The deadline for later phases is 18 month 
before their start. In case of Phase II that is June 30, 2006. 
 
The “Guidance Paper” also determines in its annex the standardized format the 
NAP has to have. (European Commission 2004a21) The NAP needs to include the 
total quantity of allowances, the quantity of allowances at activity level and the 
quantity of allowances at installation level (Points 1-3). Next (Point 4), technical 
aspects (reduction potentials, early actions and clean technology) are listed, 
followed by community legislations and policies (Point 5). Then (Point 6), it is 
required to state how the public has access to the NAPs and how the public 
opinion is taken into account and how and where the public can make 
suggestions. Under Point 7 the Commission asks the Member State to state 
criteria, other than those listed in the “Emission Directive”, that have been applied 
when developing the NAP. Lastly (Point 8), a complete list of the installations 
covered has to be added. 
 
3.3.2 Approval of National Allocation Plan 
As a step B, the NAP is submitted to the European Commission for approval. The 
European Union Climate Change Committee, EU C.C.C., a committee of 27 
experts, representatives of the Member States, assists the European Commission 
with the assessment of the NAP by expressing their views on the content of the 
NAP. 
 
The assessment of the NAPs is based on the “Emission Directive”, which names 
11 criteria in its Annex III, which are not exhaustive. The Member States are 
granted a certain freedom when it comes to issuing allowances. They of course 
cannot issue as many allowances as they want, but they are not given an explicit 
number either. The “Emission Directive” just says the Member States could issue 
as many allowances as they wanted as long as they moved within the borders the 
criteria set and as long as they respected the listed criteria. This is important since 
scarcity is necessary for a reasonable market price to form. Only if supply is lower 
than demand, do companies have an incentive to invest in cleaner technologies. 
                                                     
21 European Commission 2004a furtheron referred to as “Guidance Paper” 
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 The criteria listed in Annex III of the “Emission Directive” for the establishing of the 
National Allocation Plans are: 
Criteria 1-3 concern the Kyoto targets, the emission projections and a Member 
State’s potential to reduce emissions. They prohibit overallocation and as stated in 
the “Emission Directive” require that “the quantity shall be consistent with a path 
towards achieving or over-achieving each Member State’s target under Decision 
2002/358/EC [Burden Sharing Agreement] and the Kyoto Protocol” for Phase I. 
The allocated amount should not be higher than the amount that is likely to be 
needed, and it should take into account projections of the compliance path and the 
actual – technological and economic – potential of installations to reduce their 
emissions. Criterion 4 calls attention to other legislations of the individual Member 
States, as they should be consistent with the NAPs and not violate/contravene 
other national laws and regulations of the country in question. Criteria 5-7 concern 
non-discrimination between sectors and companies, new entrant reserves and 
early action. Non-discrimination between companies and sectors is a mandatory 
criterion and prohibits state aid. The NAPs have to state how new entrants have 
access to allowances and if a new entrants reserve is set aside, and what is done 
with the surplus allowances that may remain in the reserve at the end of a trading 
period. Early actions are emission reducing activities that are done before the NAP 
is Commission-approved and thus have an influence on the total amount of 
allowances allocated to an installation, especially in the case that the allowances 
are grandfathered, an allocation method where the total allocated amount depends 
on historical emission levels. Criteria 8-9 demand information on how clean 
technology is considered and how the involvement of the public is dealt with; how 
suggestions and comments made by the public are taken into account and where 
decisions that were made are accessible by the public. Criterion 10 mandatorily 
requires the NAP to contain a list of all installations covered by the scheme and 
how many allowances each of these installations are to receive. Criterion 11 is 
optional and asks the Member State to specify how competition from countries not 
participating in the EU ETS is dealt with. 
 
The European Commission can either accept the NAP unconditionally, partially 
reject/conditionally approve it or reject it as a whole. Up to now no plan has been 
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rejected completely. - It has to come to a decision within three months of the 
submission of the NAP. Article 9 of the “Emission Directive” allows that “within 
three months of notification of a national allocation plan by a Member State under 
paragraph 1, the Commission may reject that plan, or any aspect thereof, on the 
basis that it is incompatible with the criteria listed in Annex III or with Article 10 
[method of allocation].” The Commission has to give reasons for rejections it 
makes. 
 
Unconditionally accepted plans do not need any changing. Partially rejected plans 
are conditionally accepted, i.e. the plans need some changing before the 
authorities can start the allowance allocation process. The required changes 
depend on the European Commission, which has to explain its decisions and give 
reasons why it does not accept a plan as it stands. If the Member State then 
implements the proposed changes the plan automatically qualifies. If the Member 
State does not accept the suggested changes, a new plan has to be made, which 
subsequently has to be submitted to the European Commission for assessment.  
 
According to Memos of the European Commission three main topics for partially 
rejecting a NAP could be identified: excessive allocation, allocation exceeds 
projected emissions and ex-post adjustments. (European Commission 2004b, 
2005b) Following cases of excessive allocation were identified by the European 
Commission, ”Firstly, where a Member State does not reason how the Kyoto 
target in 2008-2012 would be respected, but left a gap to be closed with measures 
to be defined later. Secondly, where a Member State states the intention to 
purchase Kyoto credits, but does not demonstrate credible and reliable steps to 
realise these purchases. Thirdly, where a Member State bases its plan on 
projections (including economic and emission growth rates) that are inconsistent 
and exaggerated compared to official growth forecasts by the Member State itself 
or other impartial sources.” (European Commission 2005b) Ex-post adjustments 
are prohibited. After a NAP has been approved by the European Commission the 
Member State can vary the exact amount of allowances at installation level, if new 
data is available on the requirements of a plant. The total number of allowances 
must not be higher than the Commission approved amount. After possible minor 
changes the final allocation decision is made and published at national level. From 
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this point on no changes are possible anymore. The final allocation decision is 
followed by the allocation of EUAs in the national electronic registry. 
 
3.3.3 Allocation of Allowances 
As a (final) step C, after the European Commission’s approval, the total amount of 
permits of the Member State as well as the installations (ex-post adjustments are 
prohibited) is fixed and cannot be changed anymore. The EU ETS-wide cap is 
determined by the sum of the caps set by the participating countries, i.e. the 
European Commission does not set a certain cap for the Member States that is 
differentiated among them, but instead the final cap is only fixed and determined, 
when the individually approved caps are added up. 
 
The Member State is granted the total amount of EUAs for the whole trading 
phase and can choose how to divide them per year of that specific phase. Most 
Member States chose to issue the EUAs – more or less – proportionally, i.e. 
during three year-long Phase I 1/3 per year, during five year-long Phase II 1/5 per 
year. The Member State’s authorities in charge of allowance allocation can 
proceed to allocate the assigned amount of EUAs to the installations according to 
the NAP. The allocation process is completed. 
 
3.4 Monitoring, Verification, Reporting of Emissions 
According to Article 6 of the “Emission Directive” before an operator is issued 
permits he has to show that he is capable of “monitoring and reporting his 
emissions. A greenhouse gas emissions permit may cover one or more 
installations on the same site by the same operator.” Monitoring means that the 
required emission data is collected and archived for later analysis to determine the 
number of EUAs that have to be surrendered. 
 
Permits and allowances are not synonyms.  An allowance is the tradable unit of 
the EU ETS, issued by the Member State. A permit sets the monitoring of the 
emissions and the reporting requirements for an installation and is site-specific. 
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The emissions of CO2 can either be determined by measurements or by 
calculations, with the formula given in Annex IV of the “Emission Directive”, that 
states the principles of monitoring and reporting. Each year the participating 
companies, i.e. each operator under the scheme, have to report their aggregate 
emissions of the year. The produced data is verified by a third party.  
 
The European Commission has published “Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines” 
stating rules and suggestions concerning the monitoring, verification and reporting 
of the emissions. The “Monitoring Guidelines” name eight principles the monitoring 
and reporting is based on: Completeness, Consistency, Transparency, Accuracy, 
Cost effectiveness, Materiality, Faithfulness and Improvement of performance in 
monitoring and reporting emissions. (European Commission 2004c22) 
 
Annex V of the “Emission Directive” lists the criteria for verification. Each Member 
State must submit a report of the verified emissions to the Commission. Deadline 
is March 31 of the following calendar year. The report must specify each 
company’s compliance with the “Emission Directive”. Should the report turn out not 
to be satisfactory or is not submitted at all, the company is excluded from further 
trades until this subject is cleared. 
 
The companies have to return, “surrender” the required number of allowances of a 
certain year by April 30 of the following calendar year, thus have to make sure to 
be in possession of enough allowances by that date; e.g. the allowances for 2005 
have to be surrendered by April 30, 2006. The “Emission Directive” states 
“Member States shall ensure that, by 30 April each year at the latest, the operator 
of each installation surrenders a number of allowances equal to the total emissions 
from that installation during the preceding calendar year as verified in accordance 
with Article 15 [Verification], and that these are subsequently cancelled.” 
 
Issuance and surrender of EUAs each year instead of once each commitment 
period, was chosen as the preferable method in order to enforce the company’s 
paying attention to its emissions and to reduce price volatility at the end of a 
trading period. 
                                                     
22 European Commission 2004c furtheron referred to as “Monitoring Guidelines” 
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 3.5 Penalties for non-compliance 
If a participating company is not in possession of the number of allowances it 
needs at the end of the year, it has to pay a fine per missing allowance. One EUA 
enables a company to emit 1 tonne of CO2. During Phase I (2005-2007) non-
compliance is penalized with EUR 40 for each excess tonne of CO2, during Phase 
II (2008-2012) the fine is EUR 100. In addition the names of the operators that 
have not complied are published. 
 
Paying the fine, does not compensate for failing to surrender the required number 
of permits. The missing allowances still have to be returned in the subsequent 
calendar year. Article 16(4) of the “Emission Directive” states, ”payment of the 
excess emissions penalty shall not release the operator from the obligation to 
surrender an amount of allowances equal to those excess emissions when 
surrendering allowances in relation to the following calendar year.” Thus, the 
emission cap is not affected by non-compliance. The penalty can be seen as the 
price of borrowing of EUAs. 
  
The Member States deal with the penalty in different ways. In some, for instance, 
the penalty is tax deductible, a controversial possibility, since it works against the 
polluter pays principle, as the polluter is “rewarded” for polluting. Apart from 
penalizing excess emissions, the Member States have imposed different penalties 
for infringements of national provisions. The EEA gives an overview of how the 
infringements are punished in the different Member States. Operation without 
permit, infringements of monitoring and reporting obligations, and omission to 
notify changes are, partly heavily, fined and can, in some countries, even result in 
imprisonment of up to 120 days. (EEA 2008b) 
 
3.6 Emission Permit Market 
Anyone – covered or not covered by the scheme – can participate in the market. 
The only requirement is the holding of an account in the national registry. Each 
installation covered by the scheme receives a certain amount of EUAs. These can 
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be seen as the currency of the emission trading market. Participating installations 
can either buy or sell their EUAs depending on their requirements, on the free 
market for the market price. The price is a function of demand and supply. The 
installation decides, for itself, if it is cheaper to lower its emissions and thus lower 
its allowance requirement in order to make profits from selling its surplus 
allowances or to do without emission reductions and pay for additional permits. 
 
Figure 10 shows how the European Commission explained the benefits of 
emission trading for companies in a folder in 2008: 
 
 
Figure 10 Benefit of emission trading23 
 
                                                     
23 Taken from European Commission 2008a 
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3.7 Transaction Registries 
The European Commission decided upon a “Registry Regulation” to secure a 
standardized system of registries. It sets rules for the establishment and operation 
of the national registries to secure their compatibility and linkage possibility. 
(European Commission 2004d24) Article 19 of the “Emission Directive” requires 
from the Member States: “The establishment and maintenance of a registry in 
order to ensure the accurate accounting of the issue, holding, transfer and 
cancellation of allowances.” 
 
The registry shows the banking of allowances, issuances, holdings, sales, 
purchases, cancellations, transfers and surrenders/retirements of permits taking 
place in the country of each company. Each Member State has an individual, 
national registry. The Registry Regulation required the establishment of national 
registries by December 31, 2004. This deadline was only met by few countries. 
Each company, that wants to participate in the market for emission allowances, 
has to open an account, the “operator holding account”, at its national registry. Any 
person can hold allowances. The registry is open to the public. 
 
The national registries are set up in the form of standardised electronic databases, 
making it – theoretically – easy to link them. The Community Independent 
Transaction Log (CITL) is a European Central Administrator, provided for in Article 
20(1) of the “Emission Directive” that supervises all national registry systems, on 
an EU-wide basis, and coordinates all permit movements, i.e. movements of 
EUAs. The CITL in turn is linked with the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Independent Transaction Log (UNFCCC ITL) kept by the UN 
Climate Change Secretariat, based in Bonn, Germany, that coordinates all 
movements of AAUs, the emission units covered under the Kyoto Protocol. After 
many difficulties the connection of the CITL to the ITL was finally completed on 
October 16, 2008. 
  
The EUAs are held in electronic accounts in each Member State’s registry. They 
are identifiable by a serial number and do not exist in a printed version. 
                                                     
24 European Commission 2004d furtheron referred to as „Registry Regulation“ 
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 4 First Phase 2005-2007 
 
4.1 Overview – who’s in? 
Initially fifteen EU Member States, the EU-15, were part of the EU ETS: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and The United Kingdom. On May 1, 
2004 the European Union was expanded by ten Eastern European States, the EU-
10. This EU enlargement contained: The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta. Participating in 
the EU ETS was one of the conditions to become a Member of the EU. On 
January 1, 2007 Bulgaria and Romania were included in the EU and thus the EU 
ETS. Therefore, by the end of Phase I 27 nations participated in the EU ETS – 
with a total of almost 500 million inhabitants. On January 1, 2008 Iceland, 
Liechtenstein and Norway, countries not in the European Union, but part of the 
European Economic Area, entered the EU ETS. 
 
4.2 Allocation Process 
Ellerman writes “the first round of cap-setting could best be described as a 
negotiation between individual Member States and the Commission in which both 
sides were trying to agree on a mutually agreeable cap in the face of the large 
data uncertainties and some confusion over what installations met the definition for 
inclusion. Moreover, the absence of any international obligation to limit GHG 
[greenhouse gas] emissions in these years allowed a more relaxed approach to 
cap-setting.” (Ellerman 2008) The Member States had to prepare and publish their 
NAPs by March 31, 2004. The 10 new Member States that joined the EU on May 
1, 2004, were asked to keep this deadline, but could make use of a later deadline 
– their joining the EU on May 1, 2004. All new Member State made use of this 
exception of a delayed deadline. The states had difficulties keeping to the 
deadline. From the EU-15 only Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland and 
the Netherlands met the deadline. From the 10 new Member States only Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia kept their (extended) deadline.  
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 Ellerman notes, “The Commission exercised its power to review and to reject with 
considerable discretion. In practice, it focused on three criteria (out of eleven): the 
Member State total (to guard against cap inflation), the list of installations with their 
allocations (to ensure inclusiveness), and the absence of ex-post adjustments in 
allocation.” (Ellerman 2008) 
 
The assessment resulted in following decisions: 
On July 7, 2004 the Commission finished the assessment of eight plans. The 
plans of Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden were accepted 
unconditionally. The remaining three, those of Austria, Germany and the United 
Kingdom, were partially rejected. On October 20, 2004 the Commission finished 
the assessment of another eight plans. The plans of Belgium, Estonia, Latvia, 
Luxemburg, Portugal and the Slovak Republic were accepted unconditionally. The 
remaining two, those of Finland and France, were partially rejected. On December 
27, 2004 the Commission finished the assessment of five plans. The plans of 
Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania and Malta were accepted unconditionally, while 
Spain’s plan was partially rejected. On March 8, 2005 the Commission finished the 
assessment of the Poland’s plan. It was partially rejected. On April 12, 2005 the 
Commission accepted the plan of the Czech Republic unconditionally. On May 25, 
2005 the Commission partially rejected the plan of Italy. On June 20, 2005 the 
Commission accepted the last plan, the one of Greece, unconditionally. 
 
The reasons so many NAPs were partially rejected, were mainly overallocation 
and ex-post adjustments. Ex-post adjustments are explained in a Memo of the 
European Commission when “the Member State plans to intervene in the market 
after the allocation is done, and redistributes the issued allowances among the 
participating companies […].” (European Commission 2004b) This means there 
are changes and corrections of the initial allocation amounts if new data is gained, 
i.e. there can be a redistribution of EUAs among the companies after allocation of 
EUAs to operators.  The EU Commission prohibited ex-post adjustments to 
prevent misunderstandings, to lower the administrational costs and to avoid 
uncertainty for the participating companies. The “Emission Directive”, Annex III, 
lists the criteria the NAPs have to comply with. Criterion 10 prohibits these ex-post 
-47- 
adjustments, as it states, “the plan shall contain a list of the installations covered 
by this Directive with the quantities of allowances intended to be allocated to 
each.” Germany and the United Kingdom took the European Commission to court. 
Both cases concerned ex-post adjustments.  
 
Table 5 shows the final number of allocated allowances per country and year for 
Phase I and II. 
 
Table 5 Kyoto target and allocated allowances by country, Phase I and II25 
 
                                                     
25 Taken from European Commission 2008a 
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 The European Commission reduced 15 NAPs by around 290 million tons per year 
during Phase I, which account for about 15 per cent of the totally allocated 
allowances. This resulted in about 6.3 billion EUAs, not taking into account the 
NERs that were approved by the European Commission to be issued to the 
installations over the whole three-year period of Phase I. During Phase II it 
reduced 23 NAPs by about 242 million tons per year, which accounts for about 10 
per cent. 
 
4.3 Allocation Methodology 
In Phase I the Member States had to face several obstacles during the allocation 
process. Lack of data is considered to have been the biggest problem. Data was 
available, but only in aggregated form. Data on installation level was needed for 
the macro allocation, the setting of an overall appropriate cap, and for the micro 
allocation, that determines which companies receive how many allowances. 
Buchner et al. explain that the “reason for the constrained data availability was that 
the inventory data were developed from statistics of aggregate energy use and 
they did not extend to the level of the installation, which was the mandated 
recipient of the allowance allocations […].” (Buchner et al. 2007) Since the 
“Emission Directive” requires that the Member State states in its NAP how many 
allowances they plan to allocate on installation level, the allocation process 
consisted of negotiations, discussions and dialogues between the governments of 
the participating countries and the industries participating in the scheme. The 
industries had the emission data on installation level, the governments needed 
them. Buchner et al. describe that the “problem of data availability was 
compounded by the lack of legal authority to collect the relevant data. When 
combined with the pressing deadlines for NAP submission, governments had little 
choice but to rely heavily on voluntary submissions from industry, while they also 
initiated action to acquire the requisite legal authority. The surprising thing is that 
the affected firms cooperated as fully and in as good faith as appears to have 
been the case." (Buchner et al. 2006) 
 
There are different possibilities to allocate the allowances. They can be given 
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away for free, they can be auctioned or they can be sold at a certain price. Since 
most of the allowances were to be given away for free, all the while having a 
significant value, the industries had a monetary interest (e.g. windfall profits as 
EUAs are a trading currency and stipulate an asset), to get as many allowances as 
possible and turned out to be strong opponents in the negotiations of the allocation 
process.  
If they are given away for free, grandfathering and benchmarking are two possible 
allocation modes. If they are not given away for free they can be auctioned or sold. 
In that case they yield revenues, that can be used e.g. for other environmental 
policies. 
 
4.3.1 Grandfathering  
Article 10 of the “Emission Directive” determines that during Phase I at least 95 
per cent of the EUAs have to be given out for free. During Phase II at least 90 per 
cent of the EUAs have to be given away free of charge. The allocation amount 
depends on historical emission levels. This allocation method is called 
‘grandfathering’. In Phase I 23, over 85 per cent of the Member States chose this 
allocation mode exclusively. The baseline for the historical emission levels is not 
specified in the “Emission Directive.” Most Member States chose artificial 
baselines, calculated from a multi-year period. The average of several years was 
taken rather than one year to smoothen out unrepresentative output levels and 
give a picture of recent emission levels. The United Kingdom introduced a drop-
minimum rule that allowed companies to leave out an especially emission-poor 
year, when calculating their baseline. 
 
One of the drawbacks of grandfathering is, that it disadvantages new entrants who 
have no historical emission data the allocation can be based on, and it puts those 
at a disadvantage who took early action, i.e. those polluters who polluted less on a 
voluntary basis before the actual start of the trading scheme, since this has an 
influence on their historical emission levels, reduces their baseline levels and thus 
the early actors are worse off. Buchner et al. state that the “limitations imposed by 
data availability had important consequences in ruling out certain baselines and 
types of allocation for which an a priori preference may have existed. For instance, 
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Germany had advocated that allocations be based on 1990 emissions. This would 
have been in keeping with the Kyoto Protocol and with the EU Burden Sharing 
Agreement and it would have recognised "early action". It soon became evident, 
however, that data on installation level emissions in 1990 were non-existent and, 
in 2003, irretrievable in any reliable or meaningful form. Some Member States with 
better data could choose baselines that extended as far back as 1998 (United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark), but for most countries, the baseline or reference 
periods for allocation included only the most recent few years because these were 
the only years for which installation level data could be easily retrieved. 
Consequently, baselines that would automatically recognise "early action" were 
infeasible. If any recognition was given to "early action", it was the subject of 
special provisions for those who had the data and could make a convincing case. 
[...The] general pattern was to disregard early action not only because of the data 
problems but also on account of the conceptual problem of distinguishing "early 
action" from emission reductions taken for other reasons." (Buchner et al. 2006) 
 
Grandfathering is often criticised for not corresponding with the polluter pays 
principle. The polluter receives permits depending on his emission level. If he 
pollutes a lot, he receives many allowances. If he pollutes little, he receives fewer 
allowances. Critics claim that an installation has no incentive to switch to cleaner 
technologies, as that would yield fewer permits. If allocation depends on historical 
emissions, a (high emitting) coal fired plant receives more allowances than a 
(lower emitting) gas fired plant. This distorts investment decisions towards 
(environmentally more unfriendly) coal, which cannot have been the intention. 
 
Grubb and Neuhoff note that “free allocation can distort incentives. If installations 
cease to receive free allowances when they close, the withdrawal of over-
compensation creates a perverse incentive to keep inefficient facilities 
operational.” (Grubb and Neuhoff 2006) Frondel et al. studied the impact of 
emission trading on electricity prices and energy-intensive industries. They found 
that grandfathering “implies an increase in electricity prices, irrespective of 
whether strong or weak competition prevails on electricity markets.” (Frondel et al. 
2008) This conclusion may seem surprising, as many observers of the electricity 
prices accuse the lack of competition for being responsible for the electricity price 
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increases, with the electricity suppliers using the EU ETS as an excuse to increase 
their prices.  When the EU ETS was launched EUA prices started to rise almost 
immediately, as did the electricity prices. The European Commission projected the 
increase in electricity prices, but was quick to add that “it is important to distinguish 
between the target and the instrument of this debate.” Not the EU ETS is 
responsible for increased prices, but the “implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.” 
(European Commission 2004b) 
 
Ellerman and Joskow, who see the many disadvantages cost-free allocation has, 
point out, that in case of the EU ETS it “may have been wiser than often viewed. If 
nothing else, free allocation facilitates getting a program to price CO2 emissions up 
and running quickly, rather than spending years with affected interest groups 
fighting any program at all.” (Ellerman and Joskow 2008) De Sepibus, who studies 
the EU ETS in the light of state aid, shares Ellerman’s opinion and writes, the “fact 
that emission allowances were granted for free was, in particular, justified by the 
necessity to attract participants and the fact that the scheme rewarded companies 
surpassing existing standards and thus achieving a net environmental benefit.” 
Still, “compared to an emission scheme based on auctioning, it does not provide 
any supplementary incentive effect, while leading to significant distorting effects on 
the internal market. Assessed in the light of the Commission’s practice with 
respect to technical standards, the gratuitous allocation of allowances, if 
considered as amounting to State aid, would thus clearly be judged incompatible 
with the common market.” (de Sepibus 2007b) 
 
4.3.2 Benchmarking  
Another possible allocation method is benchmarking. In this case the EUAs are 
also given away free of charge. Contrary to grandfathering the allocation amount 
does not depend on historical emission levels, but is set on grounds of a technical 
comparison between the installations covered, using the best available techniques 
(BAT) as a benchmark. The “Emission Directive” defines: “’Best available 
techniques’ shall mean the most effective and advanced stage in the development 
of activities and their methods of operation which indicate the practical suitability of 
particular techniques for providing in principle the basis for emission limit values 
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designed to prevent and, where that is not practicable, generally to reduce 
emissions and the impact on the environment as a whole.”  
 
The Climate Action Network Europe recommends benchmarking for the allocation 
process of Phase II, since “under the current circumstances, benchmarks 
constitute a useful second-best alternative to auctioning for those sectors and 
products for which establishing such benchmarks are feasible.” Concerning the 
benchmarks they specify that “benchmarks should be set on the basis of best 
available technique (BAT) standards for individual processes and not use the 
average performance of existing plants.” (CAN 2006) Almost all commentators 
regard benchmarking to be preferred to grandfathering, still it was only little used. 
The reason is, that allocation based on benchmarks would project far lower 
emissions than an allocation based on actual historical emissions, which in turn 
decreases the total amount of allowances allocated to the installations. Allocation 
based on benchmarks was not accepted by the industries participating in the 
scheme during Phase I. Neuhoff et al. wrote a study on the impact of the used 
allocation method on the electricity sector and found that “an allocation based on a 
purely uniform benchmark creates the fewest distortions for both incumbents and 
new entrants.” They regard free allowance allocation as justified, as the permits 
“are used to compensate emitters for otherwise reduced profitability due to the 
introduction of ETS.” (Neuhoff et al. 2006) 
 
A de Sepibus survey points out that the reasons benchmarking was omitted in so 
many cases and finds that it was not due to lack of trying, but due to the sheer 
complexity as benchmarking is very data-intensive. The development of 
benchmarks has to take into account many aspects of each production process 
and for Phase I there was simply not enough time. (de Sepibus 2007a) Buchner et 
al share de Sepibus’ view. "The failure to adopt benchmarking more widely was 
not because of a lack of trying. Many benchmarks were proposed; but, every time 
one was tried, the resulting deviations of allocations from recent emissions at the 
installation level were too great to gain wide acceptance. This points to what is the 
biggest problem in applying benchmarks: source heterogeneity. If all sources were 
more or less alike, benchmarking would be easy; but in practice installations differ 
greatly even within the same sector. [...] An example of the extent to which output 
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heterogeneity led to differentiation is provided by the Netherlands where 120 
benchmarks were developed before the concept was abandoned." (Buchner et al. 
2006) 
 
4.3.3 Auctioning  
When auctioning is the allocation mode of choice, the permits are made available 
at an official auction.  
 
Advantages of auctioning are no more windfall profits; no need for grandfathering 
(and the development of NAPs) and benchmarking (and the resulting dealing with 
the industry lobbies); no more New Entrant Reserves, that have to be considered 
and lead to uncertainty about the total allowances available; no more competition 
distortion between Member States where similar installation are allocated different 
amounts of allowances; rising awareness of the managements of the installations 
covered if they are more included. Auctioning all EUAs would reduce the 
complexity of the allocation process by far, since the allowance allocation shares 
do not have to be broken down to installation level. The companies that require 
permits have to deal with the allowance acquisition problem themselves without 
including the governments or the responsible authorities of the Member States in 
the process. The companies have a certain demand. To meet their demand they 
can go to the market and buy the number of allowances they require at the market 
price, which is a function of demand and supply. Stern clearly argues in favour of 
auctioning and sums up that “in the long run […] auctioning is superior to free 
allocations in three crucial respects. First, it raises revenue for the government. 
Giving away that revenue as transfers to firms through free allowances would be a 
peculiar and inegalitarian use of public money relative to, say, supporting poor old-
age pensioners or the disabled, or health and education services. Second, 
auctioning can hasten adjustment. The longer allocations are given free, the less 
pressure there is on firms to move quickly. It is true that the marginal incentive of a 
carbon price should give a strong reason to economise on emissions even if 
allocations are given free. But that pressure is intensified if weak or no adjustment 
implies significant losses, rather than profits simply being lower than they might 
otherwise be. It is likely that shareholders and capital markets would react 
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differently, particularly since losses are more identifiable than the possibility of 
higher profits. Third, the process of “grandfathering” free allocations gives special 
privileges to incumbent firms and thus undermines competition by disadvantaging 
potential entrants into affected industries.” (Stern 2009, p.108f) 
 
One disadvantage is that with auctioning the price of CO2 is no longer an 
opportunity cost, but a real cost for the industries. This has a negative effect for 
participating states in worldwide competition, since companies have to pass 
through their costs of production to the consumers in order to stay in business. 
The CO2 allowances are a part of the production costs and thus increase the 
marginal production costs. If the allowances are given away for free, companies 
do not have to pass through the costs to the consumers if the price elasticity and 
competition do not allow it, because they deal with opportunity costs, the costs for 
foregone profits, and not “classic” real cost. If the allowances have to be 
purchased, actually increasing the marginal costs, companies have no choice and 
have to pass through the allowance price to the consumer. Sectors, that face high 
demand elasticity and sectors that are exposed to strong international competition, 
will have to adapt to the new situation and may not be able to survive on the 
market. Frondel et al. found that the impact of auctioning on energy intensive 
industries is severe, thus “that an abrupt transition to a complete auctioning 
system may endanger the competitive position of energy-intensive industries in 
Europe, unless all other major industrial and transition countries are integrated into 
a global emission trading system.” (Frondel et al. 2008) 
 
The EU ETS has differently strong effects in the different Member States, 
depending on the energy sources. High-emission installations, such as electricity 
producers using brown and hard coal, suffer from full auctioning, as they have to 
spend a lot of money on emission allowances. Thus, this theoretically results in 
switching to low-pollution power plants in the short run and shutting them down 
completely in the long run, that way, reaching the desired environmental-friendly 
energy production. It is questionable if it really is that easy. The world resources 
for gas are lower than the ones for coal. Switching to gas leads to further 
dependency on other countries, especially Russia, and cannot be the final solution 
of the problem. The IEA estimates, that the resources for natural gas, which are 
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clustered in only a few countries, will last around 60 years at current production. 
(IEA 2008) Convery and Redmond give a reason to continue the EU ETS, and 
state that “because of its vulnerability to energy supply interruptions from the 
Middle East (oil) and Russia (gas), the EU needs to reduce its dependence on 
imported fossil fuels. The EU ETS helps achieve this goal by operating at the 
margin as a pan-EU tax on imports. This makes local alternatives, notably energy 
conservation and renewables, more commercially viable, which has also made the 
EU ETS attractive to the renewables lobby.” (Convery and Redmond 2007) Still, it 
is often argued that it is more likely that the companies will relocate to other 
countries without strict carbon emission control instead of accepting and paying 
the high production prices. Bleischwitz et al. draw the attention to this negative 
effect the EU ETS can have on the energy intensive sector. “Under the 
assumption that the carbon prices are likely to increase again, those industries 
have – at least in parts – an incentive to relocate their production outside the EU.” 
(Bleischwitz et al. 2007) This is explained by the fact that companies do not face 
the same regulations in other countries and production may turn out to be cheaper 
elsewhere. 
 
Frondel et al. propose to make auctioning sector dependent, “in addition to ETS-
induced electricity price increases, the production cost increases resulting from 
auctioning may imply a heavy burden for energy-intensive industry sectors such as 
the cement industry or the copper and aluminium producers. Hence, although the 
grandfathering of allowances does not create additional incentives to reduce 
emissions beyond those already reflected in the ETS-induced higher electricity 
prices, non-electricity sectors should be exempted from the auctioning of 
certificates as long as all other major industrial and transition countries abstain 
from serious climate protection measures and reject the integration into a 
comprehensive global emissions trading system.” (Frondel et al. 2008) Convery et 
al. on the other hand in their study did not find “empirical evidence demonstrating 
a correlation between European carbon prices and a loss of competitiveness in the 
industrial sectors […]. However, these results were obtained in an environment in 
which allocations were overly generous for the covered industries.” (Convery et al. 
2008) Another disadvantage is the transaction costs auctioning yields. 
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 Several questions have to be considered before auctioning can start. How often 
should be auctioned? Should the auctions only be open within the Member State 
or to all participating countries of the scheme? Should the auctions of a Member 
State be coordinated with the auctions of other Member States? Who is in charge? 
Should national or system-wide auctions take place? If auctioning takes place 
more often with smaller emission allowance volumes changing their ownerships, 
smaller bidders are encouraged to participate, as it may be easier to predict prices 
and the risk is reduced. Also, steady liquidity shots may be preferable to one huge 
auction at the beginning of the trading period, as this may have a negative effect 
on market uncertainty concerning the availability of EUAs, increase price volatility 
and disadvantage new entrants who enter the EU ETS after the EUAs have been 
distributed by auction. A disadvantage of many auctions, are the higher 
administrative costs that occur with each auction. 
 
In Phase I the “Emission Directive” allowed for a maximum of 5 per cent of the 
EUAs per Member State to be auctioned. Only four countries made use of this 
possibility and set aside a certain number of allowances to be auctioned. The 
European Commission “considers that the participation in any auction should be 
open without restrictions to all persons in the Community.” (European Commission 
2006a) Thus, any registry account holder listed in the CITL could participate in any 
of the auction that took place. Denmark auctioned 5 per cent, Hungary 2.5 per 
cent, Lithuania 1.5 per cent and Ireland 0.75 per cent. This amounted to only 0.13 
per cent of total allowances issued, excluding Bulgaria and Romania. 
 
4.3.3.1 Sales in Denmark 
In the case of Denmark, 5 per cent of total allowances created accounts for 
5.025.000 allowances. Denmark decided – even though initially planned – not to 
auction, but instead opted for direct sales through agents. 
  
The first sale was held in October 2006, when 2.762.000 allowances were made 
available. The second sale took place in February 2007. Any person, from any 
country, holding a registry account, could buy allowances. The revenues made 
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from auctioning were used to cover the administration costs of the EU ETS 
implementation, the proceeds went to the Danish treasury. Pedersen sums up 
Denmark’s auctioning experience and finds that even though due “to the collapse 
of the ETS market towards the end of the first trading period, some 13% of the 
allowances were not sold,” (Pedersen 2008) the sales were a success, accruing 
total revenues of around EUR 30.4 million. Fazekas made a study on the auction 
designs in the EU ETS and writes, that concerning the success of this distribution 
method of allowances, the Danish authorities are content. The advantage for the 
market participants was that “price risk was reduced considerably by selling 
directly compared to auctioning; as changing prices between the announcement 
and the auction did not constitute a problem. The actual weighted average selling 
price […] had been higher than the average market price, meaning the average 
over the period of time during which the broker made the sale. [The average 
selling price was EUR 6.05 while the average market price at that time was EUR 
2.2] It appears that the chosen method with sales using professional agents was 
clearly better than selling at a flat rate, in effect selling at the average market 
price.” (Fazekas 2008) 
 
4.3.3.2 Auctions in Hungary, Ireland and Lithuania 
Hungary, Lithuania and Ireland all opted for the same auctioning style. These 
countries used a sealed bid uniform-price auction. Sealed bid uniform price 
auction means, that the companies make a blind, a sealed bid, in which they state 
how many allowances they want to purchase (quantity), and at what price (unit 
price). There is one auctioning round, i.e. the bidders submit their bids 
simultaneously (during a certain period of time) and cannot adjust them later. 
 
Example Sealed Bid Uniform Price Auction (see Figure 11):  
There are 100 EUAs available (Supply curve in the graph).  
Company A wants to purchase 80 EUAs at EUR 60 (Bid A in the graph, red 
circle),  
Company B needs 50 EUAs and is willing to pay EUR 30 (Bid B in the 
graph, blue circle).  
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First the bids are sorted by the prices the companies are bidding, in our 
case A-B.  
A wants 80 EUAs (100 EUAs are available) and gets 80 EUAs.  
B wants 50 EUAs (20 EUAs are available) and gets the remaining 20 EUAs. 
The lowest bid that still wins EUAs (where the demand curve meets the 
supply curve, i.e. where aggregate demand and supply are equal) 
determines the price, the clearing price (green dot in the graph).   
In our case: EUR 30, i.e. A won the bid for 80 EUAs at EUR 30, B won the 
bid for 20 EUAs at EUR 30. 
 
 
Figure 11 Example Sealed Bid Uniform Price Auction 
 
In the case of Hungary 2.5 per cent of total allowances created account for 
2.374.569 allowances set aside for auctioning. Hungary decided to hold two 
sealed bid uniform price auctions, both of which were implemented on the 
www.euets.com (Climex Auction Platform) platform. The reason to hold two 
auctions instead of one was to reduce the risk of auctioning on a low price level 
day. Due to the high price volatility throughout Phase I, Hungary considered it 
wise. - The first auction was held on December 11, 2006, when 1.200.000 EUAs 
were offered, a second auction took place on March 26, 2007 with 1.177.500 
EUAs available. The lot size was 1.000 EUAs, with the minimum bid being 
EUR0.01. In a press release, published on www.euets.com concerning the first 
auction the results are summed up. “The uniform selling price based on the 
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accepted bids was 7.42 EUR/EUA. The successful sale means revenues of 8.9 
million Euros […] for Hungary. Prices during the morning trading were between 
6.60 and 6.8. Euros on European spot exchanges. […] Bids for 3.42 million 
allowances were received, of which the Ministry of Finance accepted 1.197 million 
in order to maximise revenues from sale.” (EUETS Homepage 2006) - The 
clearing price for the second auction, in March, turned out to be EUR 0.88.  
 
The reason why not all bids for allowances were accepted, was the maximization 
of the revenues. Using the example from above, one sees, that in case of our 
example it would also have been reasonable not to accept both bids, as a higher 
clearing price can increase revenues even if the total volume of EUAs sold, is 
smaller (Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12 Revenue maximization in sealed bid uniform price auction 
 
• If only A’s bid is accepted the clearing price is EUR 60 (red circle in graph), 
resulting in revenues (vertical lines) of: 80 EUAs * 60 EUR = 480 EUR. 
• If A’s and B’s bids are accepted the clearing price is EUR 30 (blue circle in 
graph), and the whole amount of EUAs is sold, thus the revenues 
(horizontal lines) are: 100 EUAs * 30 EUR = 300 EUR 
 
In the case of Lithuania 1.5 per cent of total allowances created account for 
552.000 allowances, with the revenues made from auctioning being used to cover 
the administration costs of the EU ETS implementation. The auction was held on 
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September 10, 2007 and implemented on the www.euets.com (part of the Climax 
Alliance) platform, where the procedure is explained in a news update following 
the auction announcement, “[…] the auctioneer will set a uniform price to all 
successful bidders, which is the ‘clearing price’. For setting the clearing price, the 
bids will be listed in descending order by price (in case there are bids at the same 
price, time order will decide on ranking in a way that an earlier bid will be ranked 
higher). The bids will be marked from the top of the ranked list and their volume 
will be added up until the level where the sum of the total volume reaches the total 
number of allowances to be sold. The last marked bid’s price will be deemed as 
the clearing price, and all marked bids will be changed so that the bid price will be 
made equal to the clearing price.” (EUETS Homepage 2006) - By the time 
Lithuania auctioned, the market price for EUAs was at EUR 0.06. Like Hungary 
and Ireland, Lithuania used a sealed bid uniform price procedure. The clearing 
price turned out to be EUR 0.06 with the total offered volume of EUAs being sold. 
Selling the total amount of offered EUAs at the market price is regarded to have 
been a success, meeting the expectations, as the price was on a downward trend 
– steadily moving towards EUR 0. A week before the auction Zegnál quotes 
Gergely Szabó, analyst at Vertis Environmental Finance that managed the 
auction, predicted: “’Although there is an oversupply of phase-one emission credits 
on the market, we expect the auction to be successful’ […] ‘the price of phase-one 
emission credits currently hovers around € 7 to € 11 cent and the auction price is 
likely to be around this level or somewhat lower.’” (Zegnal 2007) The lot size was 
1000 EUAs, with the minimum bid being EUR 0.01. 
 
In the case of Ireland 0.75 per cent of total allowances created account for 
502.201 allowances, which were to be auctioned along with the allowances 
remaining in the New Entrant Reserve and allowances returned due to plant 
closures. In total 1.213.000 allowances were auctioned, accounting for 1.81 per 
cent of the total allocation. The revenues made from auctioning were used to 
cover the administration costs of the EU ETS implementation, with the proceeds 
going to the Irish treasury.  Like Hungary, the Irish Government decided to make 
multiple auctions to reduce the risk imposed by the high market price volatility. The 
pre-qualification requirement for the first (second) auction was a deposit of 
EUR 3.000 (EUR 15.000) to reduce the number of bogus bids. The bidders, who 
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lost, were refunded their deposit. Bidders who won, either had their costs 
deducted from the deposit and where paid back the rest, or had the deposit 
deducted from the settlement price. Bidders, who won but failed to honour their 
bids, lost their deposit. Convery and Redmond write, that the Irish Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) “held its first auction on February 7, 2006. A total of 
250.000 allowances, divided into lots of 500 allowances, were made available. […] 
The auction was open to any person holding a registry account. Participants were 
allowed to submit up to five mutually exclusive sealed bids. Each bid detailed the 
price per allowance that the individual was willing to pay, together with the number 
of lots that they wished to purchase at that price. The EPA received 150 individual 
bids. Five individual bids were successful in the action and were offered 
allowances at the uniform settlement price of € 26.30. On the day of the auction, 
allowances were trading at € 26.85 in the brokered market, so there was a close to 
complete allowance price convergence in the two markets.” (Convery and 
Redmond 2007) A second auction was held in December 2006, when 963.000 
EUAs (252.000 EUAs in accordance with the auctioning percentage stated in the 
NAP and 711.000 unused EUAs from plant closures) were sold at a clearing price 
of EUR 6.87 to seven winning bidders. To reduce the complexity and the 
administrative costs, the batch size was increased to 1.000 EUAs. The 
announcement of the second auction resulted in a further price drop for EUAs 
whose price was on a downward trend already. Point Carbon analyses: “While 
several traders agreed that the auction announcement had been a bearish signal 
to the market, not many saw how the EPA could have acted differently. ‘It is good 
that they auction allowances instead of giving them away for free,’ said Seb 
Walhain of Fortis Bank. He stressed that announcing auctions was good for 
transparency, a necessity for governments, but pointed out that it was 
“questionable wisdom” to allow leftovers from the new entrants reserve and 
closures to be auctioned to a market that has already been documented long.” 
(Point Carbon Homepage 2009a) In a third and final auction in March 2008 the 
EPA planned to auction the remaining 345.000 allowances. The deposit was 
lowered to EUR 2.000; the lot size remained 1.000 EUAs. After the auction any 
remaining allowances were planned to be retired on June 30, 2008 “in accordance 
with the procedure established for all pilot phase allowances.” (EPA 2008) 
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 The European Commission would welcome a higher use of auctioning since the 
allocation trend goes in that direction and experience could be gained. In the 
Emission Directive the Commission proposes that the auction revenues accrued 
are used to fight climate change. In Phase II a maximum of 10 per cent of the 
EUAs can be auctioned. Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland and the Benelux 
countries have opted for auctioning at various degrees. The remaining countries 
still hold on to grandfathering, the preferred mode by the industries. In Phase III a 
minimum of 50 per cent of the EUAs have to be auctioned. 
 
4.3.3.3 New Entrant Reserve 
According to the “Emission Directive” new entrant “means any installation […] 
which has obtained a greenhouse gas emission permit […] because of a change in 
the nature or functioning or an extension of the installation, subsequent to the 
notification to the Commission of the national allocation plan.” Thus, a new entrant 
is an installation that has started its business or extended its output capacity after 
the NAP has been submitted to the European Commission, i.e. during the trading 
period. Even though the “Green Paper” proposes a new entrant reserve (NER), 
the “Emission Directive” does not require a Member State to have one, but just 
states that the NAP “shall contain information on the manner in which new 
entrants will be able to begin participating in the Community scheme in the 
Member State concerned.” The European Commission assesses that “having new 
entrants buy allowances in the market or in an auction is in accordance with the 
principle of equal treatment.” (European Commission 2006b) - Still, all Member 
States have put aside a NER. But the EUA volumes, the allocation methods and 
the duration of availability of the NERs vary from country to country. 
 
In Phase I, not considering Bulgaria and Romania, about 195 million tons were 
reserved for new entrants, which accounts for approximately 3 per cent of total 
allocated allowances. For instance, Malta set aside a generous 26 per cent for 
new entrants, while Slovakia, being the other extreme, only reserved 0.02 per 
cent. 
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Table 6 Number and share of allowances remaining in the New Entrant Reserve at the 
end of 200726 
 
 
Most countries opted for a “first come first serve” solution. When the reserve is 
exhausted, operators in need of allowances, have to go to the market. Germany 
and Italy promised that they would purchase the allowances on the market to 
cover the demand of new entrants, should the reserve be exhausted. In the United 
Kingdom, in case of plant closures the allowances that are not issued are added to 
the NER. In some countries, such as Denmark and Sweden, the allocation is 
output-based, without consideration of the technologies used. In this case a new 
coal fired plant is issued the same number of allowances as a new gas fired plant, 
even though the coal fired plant requires more permits. Other countries, such as 
Finland and Germany take into account that different technologies used, require 
different amounts of permits, thus the allocation is emission-based. The allocated 
amount is based on benchmarks, taking into account BAT. The fate of the surplus 
                                                     
26 Taken from EEA 2008b 
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allowances from the NERs is differing as well. Austria and the United Kingdom 
opted for selling of the exceeding allowances. Belgium and Ireland auctioned their 
surplus. The other Member States that had allowances left cancelled them at the 
end of the trading period. The size of the NERs differs greatly from Member State 
to Member State. As shown Table 5 the EEA calculated, that a total of 108.410 
million EUAs were left in NERs of the Member States at the end of Phase I, 
accounting for 16 per cent of the overall NERs for this period. 
 
4.3.3.4 Plant Closures 
In case of plant closures some Member States chose to withdraw the allocated 
allowances from the installation and add them to the NERs. Other Member States 
established a “transfer rule”, which allows installation operators to transfer the 
allowances that were allocated to an installation that is planned to be shut down, 
to another installation of the same company. The idea is to give operators an 
incentive to actually shut down inefficient plants, instead of keeping them going, as 
they have a certain value due to the allowances they have been allocated. 
Ellerman states, "Some Member States have also developed transfer rules 
whereby the allowances from a closed facility can be transferred to a new facility 
under certain well-specified conditions." It is further explained, that "[...] the new 
entrant provision has no effect on abatement. While the agent receives an 
endowment that can be considered an offset to emission cost, the agent is still 
required to pay the full market price for emissions. [...The] only direct effect of a 
new entrant endowment is to increase output capacity." The transfer rule "allows 
the owner of a closed facility to transfer that facility's allowances to a new facility, 
which is thereby not eligible for a distribution of allowances as a new entrant. [...] 
the timing of the closure and start of the new facility must be within certain defined 
time periods (for instance, 18 months before or after in the German NAP). 
Typically, the transfer is calibrated to the capacity of the closing and new facilities. 
Thus, if the closed facility is larger than the new facility, only the pro rata capacity 
share of allowances may be transferred. Similarly, if the new facility is larger, all 
the allowances of the old facility may be transferred and the new facility will be 
eligible for a new entrant endowment for the amount of capacity that is greater 
than that of the closed facility." (Ellerman 2006) Buchner et al. add, that “the key 
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point of all of these transfer rules is that they operate only for new facilities within 
the Member State." (Buchner et al. 2006) 
 
4.4 The CO2 Market 
The CO2 market is a market that results from the trade of EUAs and project-based 
emission reduction credits, ERUs and CERs. It came into existence with the 
different emission targets of the countries, as companies now need permits to emit 
CO2. The carbon market is the market for the buying and selling of these credits. 
 
4.4.1 Characteristics of the Market 
The CO2 market in Europe is a very young market. Thus, the main characteristics 
are immaturity and uncertainty, both of which are main factors driving volatility. 
 
The EU ETS market is an immature market. This is one of the reasons for the high 
volatility of the CO2 prices in Phase I. New markets usually take time for real prices 
to establish. In the beginning only few players were active in the market, most 
opting for the ‘wait-and-see’ tactic. But the trading volumes increased steadily over 
time. 
Bleischwitz et al. explain the hesitation of becoming an active player in the market, 
“In the beginning, energy companies that are used to trading in the energy market 
and also leading in factoring costs, were active in the market. Accordingly, a lot of 
companies, especially smaller players, did not have a thorough understanding of 
the market and allowances were rather perceived as licences to produce and not 
as an economic asset with opportunity costs.” (Bleischwitz et al. 2007) The 
economical concept of opportunity costs tries to price profits that were not realized 
because of missed opportunities/alternatives. In emission trading the opportunity 
cost of one allowance used for production is the cost the allowance would yield on 
the market. By using the allowance, the company cannot realize the alternative – 
the selling, and thus has a foregone profit, the opportunity cost. Buchner et al. note 
that, with the launching of the EU ETS on January 1, 2005, “[…] a real or 
opportunity cost was imposed on the emissions of virtually all stationary industrial 
and electricity generating sources within the European Union.” (Buchner et al. 
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2007) In an interview of ENDS Europe with Abyd Karmali, the president of the 
Carbon Markets and Investors Association, he analyses: “As time goes by, market 
participants have developed a thorough understanding of the drivers underpinning 
the market. Their strategies are far more refined now than in previous years, which 
ought to result in a more stable trading environment. The much larger number of 
participants, higher volumes and liquidity are strong factors in favour of intra-day 
price stability.” (ENDS Europe Homepage 2009) 
 
Another characteristic of the market is uncertainty. On the one hand uncertainty 
about the total available EUAs. Some Member States had problems with the tight 
deadline to submit their NAPs, which state how many allowances a state intends 
to allocate. The EU ETS was launched on January 1, 2005. However, the last 
NAP, the plan of Greece, was only approved on June 20, 2005. This delay 
(amongst others) caused uncertainty regarding the total amount of EUAs that 
would be available on the market. This uncertainty was increased by the fact, that 
it was unclear what would happen with the surpluses left in the NERs; whether 
they were to be made available to other participants on the market or if they were 
to be cancelled. The Member States had different opinions on this subject and 
dealt differently with the surpluses. Another cause for uncertainty were the CDM 
credits. In 2004 the “Linkage Directive” was agreed on by the European 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers. It allows Member States to buy additional 
permits from outside the EU ETS for compliance. Even though the CDM credits 
were permitted from 2005 onwards and the demand given, the supply was limited. 
Due to the tight schedule of bringing the emission market into existence and CDM 
projects having a considerable lead time, they were not available when the market 
was ready for them.  Knowing the total supply ex ante is crucial the stability of the 
market. - On the other hand, uncertainty about the rules of the system in future 
trading periods. Bleischwitz et al. state, “Some companies fear that emission 
reduction efforts could be sanctioned (by possible changes) in the next allocation 
plan, so they refrain from reducing emissions in the current period.” (Bleischwitz et 
al. 2007) 
 
Efficiency of a market depends highly on the accessibility of information of the 
players. Since reliable information is not easy to acquire, the market suffers from 
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high price instability.  With accessible, verified emissions data and increased 
market experience the problems with the high price volatility of Phase I should be 
reduced. Also the permission of banking of EUAs to future phases should have a 
stabilizing effect on the market. 
 
4.4.2 The Players 
The market consists of a small number of large buyers and sellers. Therefore 
individual trades can have strong effects on the prices. Convery and Redmond 
made a study on the market and price developments in the scheme and found it 
very difficult to get data, as few market participants were willing to disclose 
information. They contacted three exchanges and seven brokers who “indicated 
that there were approximately twenty companies that were active in the EUA 
market in January 2005” and that “the majority of these companies were large 
energy suppliers and large banks, especially German banks.” (Convery and 
Redmond 2007) 
 
Table 7 Allocated EUAs and number of participants27 
Size classification 
(tCO2/year) 
Number of participants
(% of total) 
annual emission allocations
(% of total) 
<5.000 14% 0,4% 
5.000-10.000 17% 1% 
10.000-25.000 26% 4% 
25.000-50.000 15% 4% 
50.000-100.000 9% 6% 
100.000-250.000 8% 10% 
250.000-500.000 4% 14% 
500.000-1.000.000 4% 24% 
>1.000.000 3% 36% 
 
In Table 6, that uses annual data from NAPs of Phase I, one can see, that the 
number of small participants is large compared to bigger installations. On the 
same hand, the annual emission allocation of those small participants is small. 
This means that a small number of large installations account for the bulk of the 
total annual emissions. In their study, Graus and Voogt find, that “nearly a quarter 
of the total amount of installations covered in the scheme together is responsible 
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for only 0.2% of actual emissions covered by the scheme.” (Graus and Voogt 
2007) 
 
4.4.3 CO2 Markets in Europe 
Mansanet-Bataller et al. sum up the CO2 markets in Europe as follows: “EUAs can 
be traded in spot markets such as Powernext (Paris), Energy Exchange of Austria 
(EXAA, Vienna), NordPool (Oslo) and European Energy Exchange (EEX, Leipzig). 
There is also a pan-European platform called Climex Alliance where it has been 
possible to trade spot contracts since July 2005. Furthermore, in NordPool, 
European Climate Exchange (ECX/IPE, London) and EEX, it is also possible to 
trade derivatives contracts with EUAs as the underlying commodity.” The above-
mentioned Climex Alliance are The Netherlands’ New Values, Spain’s 
SENDECO2 and Hungary’s Vertis Environmental Finance. (Mansanet-Bataller et 
al. 2006) 
 
During Phase I there were – apart from CERs – two tradable assets available in 
the market, Phase I EUAs and Phase II EUAs. Trading possibilities include over-
the-counter (OTC) and organized markets trades. Also, one has to differentiate 
between spot contracts and future contracts. Spot markets are cash markets, 
referring to the fact, that goods are sold and delivered simultaneously. Goods are 
bought and delivered immediately. The contracts are effective the very moment 
they are made. Future contracts are agreements to buy a certain quantity of a 
certain good at a certain price at a certain time in the future. The delivery of that 
good is also set in the future. In other words, it is a contract that states what, how 
much, when and at what price, is to be bought or sold, and how, when and where 
the delivery will take place. 
 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo observed that “there is a huge similarity in the trends 
of Phase I OTC forward prices, spot and futures prices. The similar trend between 
figures can also be confirmed with a cross correlation analysis in prices […] and 
returns […].” Further on, the “positive and significant correlation coefficients 
indicate that all markets are strongly correlated and all of them incorporate the 
information in a very similar way.” (Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo 2008) 
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 In practice the allowances are traded either through brokers, through exchanges 
or through bilateral trades. Over-the-counter transactions through brokers are the 
most frequent ones. 
 
An aspect hindering the functionality of the EU ETS were the technical problems 
with the registries, which were not accessible for a long time. The tight deadlines 
to establish a multinational emission trading scheme with national trading 
registries for every Member State were an obstacle for many participating 
countries. Still, even critics comment most positive on the feat. Especially the 
electronic linking to the ITL, constituted a problem during Phase I. This was a 
considerable draw-back, since functioning infrastructure is a fundamental condition 
for a project the size of the EU ETS, and resulted in high price volatility for Phase I 
EUAs, as can be seen in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 Price Developments 2005-200728 
 
Allowance trading started in 2003, on a forward basis. Little volumes were traded 
then. When spot trading started in 2005 the market started to grow exponentially. 
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 As can be seen in Table 7 in 2005 there was a total surplus of approximately 4 per 
cent of allowances, in 2006 the surplus was 2 per cent, in 2007 1 per cent. 
In 2005 Austria, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom were the only 
Member States where verified emissions were higher than the allocated 
allowances would have permitted. In 2006 Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia, Spain 
and United Kingdom were short and in 2007 Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. - Either the above mentioned Member 
States did not deal with the EU ETS and the necessity to adapt carbon emissions, 
or they were the only countries who allocated reasonable amounts of allowances 
to their installations, i.e. an (overall short) amount that led to a price encouraging 
emission reduction.  
 
The considerable surplus of allowances for Phase I had consequences for Phase 
II. The European Commission required tighter emission budgets for Phase II from 
all Member States. This led to an increase in the price for Phase II EUAs starting 
from March 2007. 
 
Figure 14 shows the verified emissions of the sectors covered by the scheme per 
year and in aggregated form over the whole trading period. It is very easy to see 
that combustion installations are responsible for the bulk of the CO2e emissions. 
Another thing that becomes visible is that the verified emissions increased each 
year during Phase I. One reason can be that, due to the anticipated deficit of 
EUAs, and uncertainty reigning the market, the companies were careful with their 
emissions. Once it became clear that scarcity was not an issue, they returned to 
their business-as-usual emission levels.  
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Table 8 Number of installations, allocated allowances and verified emissions per Member 
State and trading year29 
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Figure 14 Greenhouse gas emissions by sectors 2005-200730 
 
Even though many obstacles had to be dealt with during Phase I, there was a very 
active market for the EUAs. Tritignon and Ellerman (2008) calculated a table 
showing the amount of allowances surrendered in the Member State in which they 
were issued and the amount of allowances that were surrendered in a Member 
State other than that in which they originated. One can see that the main share of 
a Member State’s issued allowances is surrendered in the Member State of origin, 
which comes as no surprise, as the Member States issue the allowances to the 
installations covered by the scheme, which have a certain demand themselves, 
they are likely to meet before they enter the market, selling their surplus 
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allowances. Especially in the first two years, when market uncertainty was very 
high, few participants entered the market. As can be seen in Table 8 the share of 
cross border surrender increased steadily over the years of Phase I. 
 
Table 9 Cross Border Surrender of EUAs31 
Million EUAs (% of total) 2005 2006 2007 
Surrendered in Member State of 
origin 1,611 (97.9%) 2,300 (96.4%) 1,879 (88.9%) 
Surrendered in another Member 
State 34 (2.1%) 85 (3.6%) 235 (11.1%) 
Total 1,645 2,385 2,114 
 
4.5 Determinants of CO2 Prices  
What factors influence the carbon prices? Springer (2003) and Christiansen et al. 
(2005), cited in Alberola et al. (2008a) identify economic growth, energy prices, 
weather conditions and policy issues as the main factors influencing the price of 
carbon. In a Memo the European Commission states, that "the price of allowances 
is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like 
economic growth, fuel price, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) 
and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is 
inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the 
risks that may result from changes in allowances prices." (European Commission 
2008b) 
 
4.5.1 Price of Energy and Abatement Options 
The IEA estimates that fossil fuels will account for around 80 per cent of the 
world’s primary energy mix by 2030, with an average increase of the primary 
energy demand of 1.6 per cent per year. The estimates of proven oil reserves will 
supply the world with oil for around 40 years at current consumption. The natural 
gas reserves will last around 60 years at current consumption. (IEA 2008) 
 
                                                     
31 adapted from Tritignon and Ellerman (2008) 
-74- 
As can be seen in Figure 15, the price of fuel has a strong effect on the price of 
the EUAs. 
 
 
Figure 15 Correlation of Fuel Prices and EUA Prices in 200532 
 
Especially gas prices compared to coal prices play an important role, as it is the 
easiest way to reduce emissions. Gas prices increased considerably in 2005 and 
2006 making the switching from coal to its cleaner substitute, gas less attractive. 
Lowrey, cited in Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2006), writes “if the price of gas 
increases relatively to the price of coal, then the cost of switching from gas to coal 
increases and – other things being equal – the demand for coal will increase. 
Therefore, the demand for carbon allowances to cover that generation will also 
rise, leading to a resultant increase in emission allowance prices.” (Lowrey 2006) 
Coal emits more CO2, thus requires more EUAs. If gas is expensive and coal 
comparably cheap, the demand for coal rises and correspondingly the demand for 
emission allowances increases. 
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Example Gas Fired Plant vs. Coal Fired Plant 
Assume  
pC … price for one unit of output from a coal fired plant 
pG … price for one unit of output from a gas fired plant 
pEUA … price of one unit EUA 
aC, bG are the indicators of the amount – percentage or multiple – of EUAs 
one unit of output requires, depending on the efficiency rate of the plant and 
the emission factor (aC and bG vary from installation to installation). 
  
Without a price on carbon output generation with a coal fired plant is 
cheaper than output generation with a gas fired plant:  
pC < pG  
 
With a price on carbon the formula changes, as one output unit from a coal 
fired plant emits more than one output unit of a gas fired plant. 
aC > bG 
pC + aC * pEUA > pG + bG * pEUA 
 
This is only true, if pEUA is sufficiently high. In that case the coal fired plant 
becomes more expensive, giving an incentive to switch to gas. 
 
Delarue et al. made a study on the short-term abatement motivations in the 
European power sector through fuel switching in the years 2005 and 2006 when 
the CO2 price increased and found that “a CO2 price [treated as additional cost for 
the fuels depending on their carbon content] of 20 Euros is not high enough to 
encourage much fuel switching at the assumed fuel prices [daily fuel prices were 
used]. However, the picture for a EUA price of 40 euro/ton is quite different. In this 
case, a relative constant abatement of about 10 kton/hour can be noticed 
throughout the entire load spectrum.” Concerning the geographical distribution of 
the abatement, they find that “the bulk of the abatement occurs in the UK with 
Germany in second place but well behind. The reason is not that coal-fired 
emissions are more in the UK than in Germany, but there is more gas-fired 
capacity. Both countries have large coal-fired generating capacity […].”(Delarue et 
al. (2008) 
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 Duerr explains that windfall profits, which have been responsible for price 
increases of energy in recent years, were not the main factor. “Political discussion 
heated up exponentially when the spiralling price effect hit the European electricity 
and gas markets in the spring of 2005. CO2 costs, however, can only explain a 
third of this price increase. The major reason for the surge of energy prices is the 
looming price of oil. Oil defines the reference price for other fossil resources, such 
as natural gas and coal. In 2005, gas prices, following oil, climbed to new price 
heights, resulting in increased capacity use of coal fired plants in the UK. Since 
these emit substantially more CO2 the European carbon market saw an 
unforeseen additional demand for CO2 certificates from the UK.” (Duerr 2007) 
 
McGuinness and Ellerman made a study on CO2 abatement in the United 
Kingdom power sector and found that "prior to 2005, the average costs of 
generating electricity from coal and natural gas were relatively close, but from 
2005 on a significant separation developed to the disadvantage of gas-fired 
electricity except for a brief period of early 2007. [...The] inclusion of a carbon price 
in 2005 had a much greater effect on the cost of coal-fired generation than on that 
of natural gas. Nevertheless, for considerable periods of time, and especially in 
late 2005 and early 2006, the relatively high carbon prices were not enough to 
compensate for the still greater increases in natural gas prices. This change in the 
price of natural gas relative to that of coal largely explains the increase in coal-
fired generation in the UK in 2005 and 2006 notwithstanding a significant carbon 
price." They calculated that "an increase of 0.1 in the ratio of the relative cost of 
coal to gas is associated with a five percentage point increase in utilization across 
gas plants and a six percentage point reduction in utilization across coal plants." 
They found, that the price on carbon did as a matter of fact lead to abatement, "[...] 
while the coal generation increased under the EU ETS in 2005 and 2006, as a 
result of high gas prices, the counterfactual suggests that these increases would 
have been substantially larger absent the EU ETS." They conclude, that "the 
estimates [...] provide clear evidence of abatement through fuel switching in 2005 
and 2006. Taken together, they suggest that in 2005 between 13.2 and 21.2 
million tons of CO2 were abated as a result of load shifting from coal to CCGT 
[gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine] plants and between 13.7 and 20.7 million 
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tons of CO2 were similarly abated in 2006. These estimates represent roughly 8-
12% of the counterfactual in both years." (McGuinness and Ellerman 2008) 
 
Concerning abatement options, switching from coal to gas is only one possibility. 
An installation can also invest in improvements in itself, e.g. the technologies it 
uses. These abatement costs are independent of the market price for EUAs, but 
depend on an installation’s overall abatement potential, its efficiency rate, its used 
technology, i.e. it depends on how “green” an installation already is, and on the 
development level of the country in which the installation is set. A heavily polluting 
installation may have low abatement costs for a certain amount of emission 
reduction, as it has more possibilities to invest in its own technologies used. Of 
course the abatement cost, so to say the costs of internal emission reduction, 
increase if the abated emission quantity increases, and at some point they are 
infinite when no further abatement is possible at all, always depending on the point 
in time considered, as technological progress may offer new abatement options. 
Abatement costs can be (one-time) investments in the installation that reduce the 
installation’s CO2 emissions and thus lower its overall demand for emission 
allowances. Simply put, if an installation emits less, it requires fewer permits to 
emit. Abatement costs, if the abatement is seen as a project to make the company 
greener, consist of fixed costs and possibly variable costs. To be able to make a 
decision, whether or not a certain abatement possibility pays, i.e. is cost-effective, 
the costs are split to a yearly level and depreciated over the time period the 
reduction brings a benefit. 
 
Example Abatement Costs: 
An investment, that yields an emission reduction of 1 tCO2 per year, costs 
EUR 100. The installation expects lowered emissions for 10 years through 
the investment, because after 10 years the technology may be too old and 
replaced anyway. Thus, the abatement costs per year are EUR 10 
(EUR 100/10 years). These costs are compared to the actual and expected 
future market price for emission allowances at a given time. Then, an 
investment decision is made. This in turn means that the market price has 
to be sufficiently high to encourage abatement. 
 
-78- 
 Figure 16 Cost-effectiveness of abatement 
 
Figure 16 shows that a certain market price of permits, pEUA, is necessary that a 
company chooses to abate. In the graph an average level of abatement costs at a 
certain time is assumed, as these costs vary greatly from country to country and 
installation to installation and depend on the time of the possible investment. 
 
1. d1, s1, p1 < pAC 
At first we have a certain aggregated demand curve d1 and a supply curve 
s1. The supply curve is the fixed amount of credits issued by the Member 
States. s1 and d1 meet and form a market price, p1, at a quantity q1. For 
simplification the market price is assumed to be linear. Price volatility is not 
taken into account, neither are price speculations and the companies’ 
decisions when to buy and sell. To encourage abatement the price for 
credits has to be higher than the costs of abatement, pAC. As p1 < pAC 
abatement would not be cost-effective, i.e. it is cheaper to emit more and to 
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buy additional credits, than to invest in emission reduction. Thus, 
companies will choose not to abate. 
 
2. d1, s2 < s1, p2 > p1, p2 > pAC 
Assume now, the supply is reduced to s2. The scarcity in the market lets the 
market price jump up to p2. In this case the abatement costs, pAC, are 
smaller than the market price of emissions, p2, encouraging and maybe 
resulting in abatement. 
 
3. d2, s2, p3 < p2, p3 = pAC 
Abatement reduces emissions, thus, decreases the demand for emission 
credits. This shifts the demand curve, d1, down/left to d2, where a new 
market price, p3, forms, that is equal to the costs of abatement, pAC. 
 
A company makes an abatement decision by comparing the abatement costs, pAC, 
for a certain quantity of emissions with the costs for the same quantity of EUAs, 
which depend on the market price of the EUAs, pEUA.  
 
 
 
Figure 17 Abatement vs. Emission Decisions 
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Figure 17 shows two curves, the reduction curve, “red”, and the permit cost curve, 
“perco”: 
Each installation has an individual reduction curve, which is a function of 
qAC and pAC and has a positive slope, i.e. the more is reduced the higher the 
costs. As the different investment possibilities have different (step-fixed) 
costs and yield different abatement quantities, it may be reasonable to 
assume a step-by-step slope. 
The permit cost curve gives the aggregated costs for emission permits, pEUA 
that have to be spent for a certain emission quantity, qEUA. It is a linear 
function whose slope is the market price for EUAs, pEUA. 
Upon deciding whether to abate or to emit a company looks at the costs of 
pEUA and pAC at any quantity A.  
The abatement of A emission units has a price, red(A), A*pAC. The costs 
that would occur if the A emission units were emitted and thus required 
permits are perco(A), A*pEUA. Which option is cheaper? 
 
As we assume a step-by-step slope a company will want to maximize the amount 
of reduced emissions at a certain price, after having chosen abatement. 
In the graph it means that the company will want to maximize A (red circle) so that 
red(A) < perco(A), shifting the abated quantity to the right as far as possible 
without increasing the price. 
 
4.5.2 Total Supply of Allowances 
The total amount of allowances granted in the NAPs has a substantial effect on 
the price of the EUAs. During Phase I the total supply of allowances was never 
entirely clear to the market participants. Trotignon and Ellerman explain that “the 
allocations to installations reported in the CITL understate the total number of 
allowances allocated to the installations in some instances, and overstate the 
number in others.” The reason for this is that apart from the NER and the optional 
auctioning percentage, “not all allowances as approved by the Commission were 
distributed. Installations in several Member States, especially in the United 
Kingdom, exercised the opt-out provision and the allowances authorized for them 
were cancelled. EUAs forfeited under the closure provisions, as well as any 
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unclaimed in the new entrant reserve were annulled in some Member States, but 
sold in others. As a result, neither the approved Member State totals nor the sum 
of the allocations to installations as reported in the CITL reflects the total number 
of allowances available for compliance.” (Tritignon and Ellerman 2008) This further 
means, that the total supply of allowances for Phase I was not known until after 
the end of Phase I. 
 
The important role the overall supply of allowances plays could be experienced, 
when the NAPs of Phase II were approved by the European Commission. After the 
verified overallocation of Phase I the Commission found that the verified emission 
reports of the first trading year, 2005, were the most reliable, accessible data on 
actual emissions on installation level. Thus, they became the baseline for the 
European Commission’s assessment of the Phase II NAPs. Consequently, the 
Commission reduced the number of allocated allowances for Phase II more than 
anticipated. "The Commission completed its assessment of NAPs for the 2008-
2012 period with a final set of decisions taken in late October 2007. The cap for 
the new period represents a reduction of almost 140 million allowances compared 
to verified emissions in 2005 from installations covered by the EU ETS, i.e. a cut of 
6.8%, while still taking account of additional installations included in 2006/2007 
and those that will be added in 2008." (European Commission 2007b) In a Memo it 
is summed up that "for the second trading period EU ETS emission have been 
capped at around 6.5% below 2005 levels to help ensure that the EU as a whole, 
and Member States individually, deliver on their Kyoto commitments." (European 
Commission 2008b) Following these decisions, the price of the EUAs reacted 
instantly with an increase. 
 
Another aspect is that by September 2005, nine months after the launch of the EU 
ETS, only eleven (of the 25) registries had been opened, accounting for about half 
of the allocated allowances. This had a negative effect on the liquidity in the 
market, as Eastern European countries, which later turned out to be long, could 
not participate in the market yet. 
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4.5.3 Supply of Additional Credits 
In general CERs are cheaper than EUAs, even though the price of CERs reacts 
very similarly to those of EUAs, (especially) from 2008 on. The main reason, why 
CERs are not as expensive as EUAs, is uncertainty. During Phase I it was 
uncertain when the infrastructure for the CERs was going to be ready. Also the 
overall supply level of CERs was unknown. These additional uncertainty factors 
had a lowering effect on the CER prices, since fewer market participants were 
willing to invest in such a highly uncertain asset. Still, offering this additional, 
slightly cheaper emission permit, in turn, has a lowering effect on the price of the 
EUAs. With the infrastructure in place and trading experiences gained, the prices 
of EUAs and of CERs (and from 2008 also from ERUs) are expected to assimilate 
more and more – with the EUAs remaining slightly higher, as the use of CERs has 
been limited (starting in Phase II) according to the percentage fixed in the NAPs of 
each Member State. Broadening the market has a positive effect for the 
participants. A larger market is more stable and thus reduces price volatility. With 
higher market liquidity, uncertainty for the players is reduced. Higher market 
confidence makes long-term investment decisions easier. 
 
Ireland, Finland and the Netherlands rely on these flexible mechanisms of the 
Kyoto Protocol to a substantial degree. The European Commission therefore 
limited the share of CDM and JI credits made available to the Member States, 
since a high percentage relocates the measures against climate change to other 
countries, all the while not guaranteeing the success of the projects. 
 
During Phase I linkage did not play a central role. At first, there was demand for 
CERs until the end of April 2006, but no supply. When there was finally supply in 
the end of 2007, there was no more demand. CDM and JI projects have a year-
long lead time. The “Linkage Directive” was only issued in 2004; too short for 
projects to be chosen, approved and certified. Also, the registry link that finally 
enabled the use of CERs was not in place until 2007. The ITL, that supervises 
trades from all Kyoto Flexibility Mechanisms (Emission trading credits – EUAs, JI 
credits – ERUs and CDM credits – CERs) linked to the CITL (which only 
supervises the EUAs, thus making the use of CER credits, even though it would 
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have been allowed, impossible until then) on November 14, 2007. At that time, the 
EUA price was already down to zero and with it the demand to purchase additional 
credits. Thus, no project based credits were surrendered 2005-2007. CERs finally 
became available in the end of 2007. As CERs are credits from outside the 
system, they do not fall under the banking restrictions. At that time EUAs for 
Phase II had a value of around EUR 20, while Phase I EUAs had none. Thus, all 
CERs that could have been used in Phase I were banked for Phase II. The 
amount that can be banked is limited to 2.5 per cent of the Member State’s Kyoto 
target for CERs and 2.5 per cent for ERUs. 
 
The high demand in the beginning of the first trading phase showed that CERs 
would become increasingly important in the near future. The European 
Commission has added a twelfth criterion to its Annex III of the “Emission 
Directive”, that have to be taken into account for the development of the Phase II 
NAPs, concerning the supplementary of CDM and JI credits and published new 
guidelines on how the Annex III criteria were to be interpreted. The European 
Commission (2006a) limited the overall amount of CDM and JI credits, deciding 
that no more than “half of the effort undertaken by a Member State, taking into 
account government purchases, is made through the Kyoto flexible mechanisms” 
and elaborate on the calculation of the exact amount, that in “practical terms the 
Commission assesses consistency with supplementary obligations based on the 
following formulae: 
A = base year emissions – emissions allowed under Kyoto target 
B = greenhouse gas emissions in 2004 - emissions allowed under Kyoto 
target 
C = projected emissions in 2010 – emissions allowed under Kyoto target  
D = 50% of Max (A, B, C) – annual average government purchase of Kyoto 
units 
Maximum allowed limit (in %) = (D/annual average cap) or 10%”  
 
This means that Member States may, additionally to their domestic measures, buy 
50 per cent project based credits. If the government buys many credits, fewer are 
available for the private sector. To avoid that the government excludes the private 
sector completely from the additional credit system, the European Commission 
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decided that installations were allowed to use flexmex credits by up to 10 per cent 
in addition to the allowances they were allocated. If an installation wants to use 
more than the 10 per cent limit, the Commission, upon deciding if increasing the 
limit is reasonable, takes into account the Member State’s “path to Kyoto”. The 
reason for the European Commission’s decision to limit the level of allowed CERs 
and ERUs is obvious. If there was no limit, the Member States would import as 
many credits as they needed to cover their entire shortage. Without shortage the 
price for EUAs would be too low to encourage abatement. 
 
Table 10 lists the project-based credit limits as stated in the NAPs of the individual 
Member States for Phase II. 
 
Point Carbon analysed that with the present solution the import of credits “will not 
be enough to cover the entire short in the EU ETS [because …] the limits are per 
installation level. Thus for the full import potential to be realised, each installation 
across the EU ETS would have to submit imported credit for compliance. With so 
many diverse installations (and companies) across all sectors and countries, there 
is reason to believe that the full import will not be realised.” (Point Carbon 2007) Of 
course the credits will reduce the need for internal abatement, but not to the extent 
it would have without the limit. 
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Table 10 Credit limits of the Member States in Phase II, all in Mt/year33 
 
 
4.5.4 Banking and Borrowing 
Banking of allowances means saving allowances in one year for the requirements 
in a later period, borrowing means using allowances for the requirements in one 
                                                     
33 Taken from Point Carbon (2008) 
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period from a later period. EUAs are issued annually, i.e. 2006-EUA can either be 
used in 2005 (borrowing) or it can be used in 2007 (banking). Banking and 
borrowing are allowed within Phase I. 
 
At the end of each trading period the (surrendered as well as unused) allowances 
of that period are cancelled. In case of banking, EUAs from trading period 1 are re-
issued as EUAs for trading period 2. Companies have to return the amount of 
EUAs for a certain year (A) by April 30 of the following year (B). The EUAs for the 
following year (B) are already allocated on February 28 of that year (B). Permits 
allocated for the following year (B) can thus easily be used to meet the demand of 
emission allowances for the previous year (A). This possibility of borrowing, during 
these overlapping time horizons when EUAs for both phases are valid, is intended 
to smooth out unusual extremes, e.g. exceptional weather conditions. 
 
Kruger et al. explain one of the advantages of banking, stating that banking “tends 
to put a lower bound on prices in each periods, as sources see future value in 
saved allowances and will therefore choose to hold on to them rather than selling 
them at an unusually low price or using them when relatively inexpensive 
abatement options remain available.” (Kruger et al. 2007) 
 
By prohibiting banking between the phases the learning and trial phase was given 
special emphasis as such, since the two phases were EUA-wise completely 
disconnected. The Member States were put on track of the Kyoto targets and 
could acclimatize to their new environment, an environment in which carbon has a 
price. In the end, it was independent of the Kyoto compliance period and the 
market had time and opportunity to gain experience and develop slowly. 
 
It is often criticized, that by prohibiting banking, (the anyhow low) market stability 
was further lowered, since the investors could not build up confidence. Without 
banking the allowances expire with the end of each commitment period, meaning 
they are valid only a limited duration and after the expiration, at the end of the 
period, they become worthless. 
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 Figure 18 Banking 
 
Figure 18 visualizes banking.  
Looking at two years we have two individual supply curves, s1 and s2. This 
is the amount of credits available in the market each year.  
Assume the demand in year 1, d1, is lower than s1 (e.g. due to cheap 
abatement options), i.e. the market is long (x1).  
In the case of banking only s1,used is emitted and the surplus (x1) is saved for 
the second year.  
In the case that banking is not allowed and the market is long the company 
has no incentive to invest in cheap abatement possibilities as it is still 
cheaper to emit. In that way, x1 is not saved. 
Assume now that in the second year the demand, d2, doubles (e.g. due to 
economic growth). The supply, s2, is the same as the year before and the 
market is short (x2). 
In the case of banking the aggregate supply of both years, s1+2, suffices to 
meet the aggregate demand for both years, d1+2. In the case of no banking 
the market is short (x2). 
 
Banking and borrowing between Phase I and Phase II was principally allowed, but 
for each Member State to decide. It was prohibited in all Member States apart from 
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France and Poland that allowed for restricted banking from 2007 to 2008, even 
though the European Commission did not prohibit banking explicitly from Phase I 
to Phase II. But the Commission left the Member States no real incentive to allow 
this measure. The banked amount had to be deducted from the 2008-2012 target, 
reducing the cap for Phase II, because Phase I was a learning phase, while Phase 
II is the Kyoto compliance phase. The reason for this is that banked allowances 
obviously increase the total number of allowances available during the Kyoto 
phase. If the market is flooded with allowances from the previous phase, reaching 
the Kyoto targets is jeopardized. For this reason I find the prohibition of banking in 
this special case very reasonable. By not allowing allowances from the earlier 
phase enter the Kyoto phase, it was stipulated very clearly that the “trial phase” 
was over. The companies had their chance to adapt and to get accustomed to the 
new situation, whether they made use of this possibility or not. Now, in Phase II, 
the learning-by-doing is over. The consequences of the mistakes that were made 
during Phase I (overallocation, problems with the registries, etc.) are swept away. 
Only the experience gained remains. It is a new beginning. From March 2007 on 
the price for Phase I EUAs was little above EUR 0 and in the end the market was 
long. Letting these excess allowances enter the Phase II market would have been 
very questionable. Of course one can argue that the price would never have 
decreased so sharply, but still I believe the prohibition was justified for the sake of 
the Kyoto targets. 
 
Banking is allowed from Phase II to Phase III. This will reduce price fluctuations 
that occur due to the ending of one trading phase. Trotignon and Ellerman found 
that the “timing of the volume of compliance trading […] provides strong evidence 
that operators have engaged in borrowing [during Phase I]” and that “whether 
intended or not, borrowing to meet 2005 and 2006 compliance requirements 
turned out to be a very profitable move by those engaging in it. It was nevertheless 
a speculation on future EUA prices, especially for the 2005 compliance year when 
EUA prices were hitting all time highs shortly before the April 2006 surrender 
deadline and at least some analysts were predicting still higher prices to come.” 
(Trotignon and Ellerman 2008) 
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4.5.5 Economic Growth and Expected Emissions 
Forecasts of the GDP rates affect the permit prices. In case of optimistic 
projections, existing installations are expected to emit more, as they are expected 
to produce more. New installations will start to emit as they start their productions. 
With increasing output, the demand for energy rises, as do emissions. 
The growth rates are included in the allocation formula and may have been one 
reason for the overallocation of permits in 2005. Economic growth has an upward 
effect on the prices of EUAs. With expected economic growth, the expected 
emissions increase, due to the higher production level. This causes an increase in 
demand for EUAs. Vice versa it can be said that in times of declining economic 
growth, when companies produce less and thus emit less, they are in need of 
fewer allowances for themselves. Should they then try to sell their excess 
allowances in the market; the prices will – in theory – be low, with reduced 
demand and increased supply. This can presently be seen. Due to the economic 
slowdown there has been a price drop for Phase II EUAs. 
 
4.5.6 Climate Conditions and Temperature 
Do weather extremes have an influence on the price of CO2 allowances? Since a 
considerable share of the installations covered in the EU ETS are in the heat and 
power sectors, it is plausible, that the weather does play a role. The summer of 
2005 was above-average hot and the winters of 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 were 
below-average cold. Did the weather influence the price of EUAs? Different 
studies have dealt with this question. 
 
The idea behind this assumption is that extreme weather conditions lead to 
abnormally high energy use. On extremely cold days, energy consumption 
increases due to increased use of heating. On extremely hot days, energy 
consumption increases due to increased use of cooling, such as air conditioning. 
Mansanet-Bataller et al. confirm this assumption in their study. “The impact of 
these variables on the CO2 returns is positive, which means that the prices of CO2 
increase with extremely hot and cold days.” (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2006) In a 
study on the price fundamentals of EUAs Alberola et al. found that “forecasting 
errors on temperatures seem to matter more than temperatures themselves during 
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extremely cold events when one tests for the influence of climatic events on CO2 
price changes” and point out “that these concluding remarks only hold for 
extremely cold days and not for extremely hot days.” (Alberola et al. 2008b) 
 
Apart from weather extremes it seems reasonable to assume, that wind and 
rainfall can have an influence on the EUA prices as well, since they give the 
possibility of substitution to renewable energy production. Mansanet-Bataller et al. 
tried to find a connection between the price of EUAs and rainfall, stipulating that 
dry days would increase the price, while rainy days would lower the price, due to 
the given substitution possibility through hydro energy, which is cleaner and would 
thus lower the amount of needed permits. The results show that “the rainy days 
and the dry days do not have significant influence on the CO2 returns.” (Mansanet-
Bataller et al. 2006) 
 
4.6 Price Volatility 
Lack of maturity of the EU ETS market caused the high volatility of the CO2 prices 
in Phase I. Firstly, new markets require a certain time for their real price 
discoveries. Secondly, the high level of uncertainty on different aspects of the 
market has a negative effect on the investment decisions. Volatility is considered 
in investment calculations and makes decision making for long-term investment 
difficult. High volatility reduces confidence in the market. Still, it is not uncommon 
and no reason to call the whole EU ETS a failure. Stern writes that “in the US 
market for tradable sulphur dioxide allowances, which originated in the late 1980s, 
it took several years for prices to stabilise, with the price for an avoided tonne of 
SO2 fluctuating from lows of $70 to highs of $1,550. Over time, players became 
accustomed to the system, policy rules became clearer and financial 
intermediaries entered the picture, all of which contributed to greater price 
transparency. Once a degree of certainty emerged, the SO2 markets took off, with 
emissions declining strongly over time.” (Stern 2009, p.107) 
 
In the case of the EU ETS the price volatility can be seen in Figure 18. The yellow 
line shows the price for Phase I EUAs. 
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 Figure 18 Prices of EUAs and traded volumes 2005-present34 
 
4.6.1 2005  
The lack of transparency on the actual volume of trading and the scarce data on 
verified emissions and emission allowances, caused high volatility. 
The sudden development of the skyrocketing oil price had a negative effect on the 
EUAs, since it in turn affected the gas price, which in turn became less attractive 
than coal, which requires more EUAs. Figure 19 shows the volumes and prices for 
EUAs during the first year of the EU ETS. 
 
In January 2005 the power sector, foreseeing a shortage almost instantly started 
buying allowances; only projections were available, no verified emission data. 
Other participants in the market, especially those who later turned out to be long, 
were not willing to sell their surplus allowances quite yet, either due to lack of 
information on actual emissions (wait-and-see attitude) or because they saw no 
incentive to participate in the market, having sufficient EUAs themselves and no 
motivation to generate profits by selling surplus allowances. Thus, with a high 
demand and little willingness to sell, the price soared up. Mainly Eastern European 
companies had long positions. These companies, unfortunately, could not 
participate in the market, as they faced problems with the provision of their 
national registries. 
                                                     
34Taken from the Point Carbon Homepage 2009  
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Figure 19 Volumes and prices in 200535 
 
Another reason for the high prices is, that the winter of 2005 was below-average 
cold and that gas prices reached a historical high. The demand for electricity was 
high, and along with it, the demand for EUAs. 
 
After a steady increase in the first half of 2005, this led to a rather stable price for 
EUAs during the second half of the year. 
 
Point Carbon “estimates that the international carbon market in 2005 transacted a 
total of 799 Mt CO2-equivalents worth approximately € 9.400 million. […] In total, 
the brokered and exchanged market did 262 Mt CO2, corresponding to €5.4 billion. 
Brokers did 79% of this volume, whereas the ECX was by far the largest 
exchange, with 63.4% of the exchanged volume.” They argue that even though the 
value of the market increased by 2500% compared to 2004, “and now involves 
players in close to 150 countries, it is still early days. Traded volumes compared to 
the underlying volume are still far below what we can observe in other markets.” 
(Point Carbon 2006a) 
                                                     
35 Taken from Point Carbon (2006a) 
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 4.6.2 2006 
In 2006 the traded volumes increased considerably as the deadline to surrender 
the EUAs for the first trading year inched closer, reaching a peak in April for the 
time being, as companies needed to acquire their missing EUAs. By April 30, 2006 
the companies had to surrender their permits for the previous calendar year, 2005. 
The data would then nationally be aggregated and reported by the Member States 
to the European Commission that would publish the emissions data and the 
surrendered EUA information, in aggregated form, on May 15, 2006. Figure 20 
shows the price development and the traded volumes of EUAs in the second year 
of the EU ETS. 
 
 
Figure 20 EUA Prices and traded volumes in 200636 
 
In the end of April, within a week, EUA prices soared down in a sudden drop from 
over EUR 30 to under EUR 10, because the verified emission data for the year 
                                                     
36 Taken from Point Carbon (2007) 
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2005 had leaked into the market when several Member States officially pre-
released their verified emission data. Convery and Redmond explain “between 
April 24 and May 2, five Member States (the Netherlands, Czech Republic, 
France, Sweden, and Belgium [Walloon Region]) released information showing 
that their overall 2005 position was long.” (Convery and Redmond 2007) As a 
consequence the European Commission asked the remaining Member States not 
to pre-release their emission data early, but the damage was done. On May 15, 
2006 the European Commission officially released the verified emission data from 
all member states, except Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta and Poland. It became clear 
that, instead of the anticipated deficit and scarcity reigning the market, there was a 
considerable over-allocation of emission allowances, with an allowance surplus of 
about 4.6 per cent. The participating sectors had emitted 63.3 million tonnes CO2 
less than they would have been allowed to emit. Only six countries (Austria, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and the United Kingdom) were short of allowances. 
 
On the whole, in 2006 the average prices were higher than expected. In 2005 the 
market was long, i.e. there were more emission allowances available than the 
verified emissions would have needed. The same was to be expected for the year 
2006 and 2007; still the price did not decrease to zero just yet. After the drop, 
prices quickly recovered. They did not reach the April 2006-peak (ever again until 
the present), but stabilized at little over EUR 15 until September 2006. 
 
One reason for the relatively high prices could be that the players, the active 
trading participants, had an incentive to keep the prices high. Depending on the 
price elasticity of customers, the companies can pass through their production 
costs. They receive the permits for free. On the market the permits can be sold at 
a certain price, the market price – which is in any case over zero (the price the 
permits were allocated for). This balance/difference gives the opportunity costs, 
which can be added to the initial price for the customers.  
 
Oberndorfer analysed stock market effects of the EU ETS and the “results suggest 
that EUA price increases (decreases) positively (negatively) affect stock returns 
from the most important electricity corporations covered by the EU ETS. In this 
respect, the electricity corporations considered are up-valued in case of a EUA 
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appreciation and down-valued in situations where the price of EU Emission 
Allowances falls.” (Oberndorfer 2009) 
 
Another reason for the high prices in 2006, as stated in a press release from Point 
Carbon, “is that there is a lack of sellers in the carbon market. While the market 
might be fundamentally oversupplied, primarily within the industry sectors, one has 
reasons to believe that the volumes have in general not been made available. The 
power sector, which has an immediate demand to cover its production, has had to 
purchase allowances at whatever the prevailing price has been.” (Point Carbon 
2006b) 
 
In Figure 20 one can see that the traded volumes decreased to pre-April 2006 
levels after the settlement of the first trading year. On the whole, the traded 
volumes increased steadily over time. The price for Phase II-EUAs followed the 
price for Phase I-EUAs closely until September 2006, when the Phase I-EUAs 
started to lose their value, while Phase II-EUAs climbed up again following a 
certain trend. 
 
Point Carbon found “that the international carbon market in 2006 saw a total of 1.6 
billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e), worth approximately € 22.5 
billion in transaction. […] In total, the brokered and exchanged market saw 817 Mt 
CO2 changing hands, corresponding to € 14.6 billion. Brokers did 71 per cent of 
this volume, whereas the ECX took over 75 per cent of the volume carried on 
exchanges. […] the direct bilateral market (company-to-company, not through 
brokers or exchanges) doubled in size from 100 Mt in 2005 to 200 Mt in 2006, with 
a value of € 3.6 billion. The total volume in the EU ETS in 2006 was just over one 
billion tonnes CO2, worth €18.1 billion.” (Point Carbon 2007) 
 
4.6.3 2007 
Interestingly, the release of the verified emission data for 2006 in April 2007 had 
no effect on the EUA prices. The reason is that expectations for 2006 were based 
on verified emissions of the year before. Uncertainty on the actual magnitude of 
aggregate emissions was considerably lower than the year before. In September 
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2006 the price for Phase I EUAs started its steady decline from around EUR 15, to 
EUR 4 in January 2007, and close to EUR 0 by March 2007, where it remained 
throughout the year (Figure 18). The reason for this value is of course, that the 
verified emission data showed, that no shortage would occur. In combination with 
the prohibition to bank allowances, the EUAs for Phase I became worthless with 
the end of the trading period. - At that time the price of Phase II-EUAs was around 
EUR 25. Point Carbon estimated that the “EU ETS saw a traded volume in 2007 of 
1.6 Gt [1 Gt = 1 billion tonnes] and a value of € 28 billion.” (Point Carbon 2008) 
 
4.7  Investment Decisions 
In a trading scheme each company faces the question how to minimize its 
emission costs. Depending on different factors the objective and the constraints 
have to be differentiated. Looking at the possibility of whether or not linking and 
banking are allowed, four scenarios occur. 
 
Assumptions: 
• the only linking credits that can be used are CERs. The rules for ERUs are 
the same as for CERs though, thus the formulas could easily be amended 
to include ERUs. 
• all companies to be price takers, i.e. we consider the market price for EUAs 
and CERs to be given. 
• abatement costs are costs that occur through realizing investment 
possibilities that make an installation i “greener”. 
• selling of credits is not allowed. The players can only buy and use or buy 
and bank credits for themselves. 
 
Table 11 lists the abbreviations used in the formulas. 
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Table 11 List of Abbreviations used in the formulas 
 
 
Table 12 Variable Explanation 
 t=1 t=2 t=3 
    
bought t1 bought t2 bought t3 x, z used t1 used t2 used t3 
bought/banked t1 bought/banked t2 bought/banked t3 overline 
x, z used t2 used t3 used t4 
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 Table 12 wants to give an overview of the variables x and z. Each column refers to 
the year in which the credits were bought. The first line are x and z which are 
bought and used in the same year. The second line are overline x and overline y, 
referring to the fact that they are bought in one year and used in the next. 
 
4.7.1 No Linking No Banking 
 
 
 
In the case that neither linking nor banking are allowed, each installation i has the 
objective (1). Each installation can choose between actual emission and emission 
abatement. As we assume that the companies are price takers, we consider the 
market price as given. The price for abatement differs from installation to 
installation. The total costs that occur are minimized. (2) is a quantity constraint, 
requiring that the total amount of emissions “paid for” in EUAs is not to be greater 
than the total supply of EUAs available in the market. As EUAs are valid only one 
year this constraint has to be applied each year separately. (3) is a constraint 
concerning the abatement quantity. It states that the amount of emissions that are 
saved through abatement over the years cannot be greater than the maximum 
possible abatement quantity, i.e. the total abatement potential, of each installation 
i. (4) requires that the total expected emissions are accounted for one way or the 
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other, either through emission credits or through emission abatement. (5) is a 
simplification that prohibits the selling of the credits. 
 
4.7.2 No Linking Yes Banking 
 
 
 
In the case that linking is prohibited, while banking is allowed, the objective (6) 
looks a bit different than in the “no linking no banking” case. In year 1 there are no 
banked credits from the year before that can be used. Thus, the installation faces 
the same decision as in the first scenario, to either pay for actual emissions by 
buying EUAs or to reduce its emissions through abatement. Starting from the 
second year, the installation can again decide between buying EUAs and reducing 
its emissions, or it can use the EUAs it banked in the year before. On the whole 
each installation will want to minimize its total costs. If a company believes that the 
price for EUAs will increase it may decide to buy credits in the present year for the 
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next year by banking these credits. Constraint (7) states that the total number of 
EUAs bought in year t (independent of whether they are used in the same year or 
banked for the next year) cannot exceed the total available amount of EUAs in the 
market in the same year. (8) is the same as (3), limiting the abatement quantity. It 
states that the amount of emissions that are saved by an installation through 
abatement over the years cannot be greater than the total abatement potential of 
that installation. (9) states that the used credits (the ones that were banked from 
the year before and the ones that were bought this year) and the year t’s abated 
emission quantity has to be equal to the installation’s total expected emissions 
minus the emission reductions that were made in previous years (as these 
emission reductions are made in one year but also lower the emissions for years 
to come). This constraint is valid for all years t and all installations i. (10) stipulates 
that in the first year there are no banked credits from the year before. (11), like (5), 
prohibits the selling of credits. 
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 4.7.3 Yes Linking No Banking 
 
 
 
In the case that linking is allowed and banking is prohibited, the objective function 
(12) looks like (1) but has to be extended for the newly opened possibility of 
“paying” for the emissions with CERs. (13) and (14) are quantity constraints as 
before, limiting the supply of EUAs and the maximum possible abatement quantity. 
(15) restricts the total quantity of CERs, requiring that the amount of emissions 
“paid for” in CERs is not to be greater than the total supply of CERs available in 
the market. (16) limits the amount of CERs that may be used by an installation, by 
stating that the emission quantity paid for in CERs, must not exceed a certain 
percentage – which is up to each Member State to decide and stated in the NAP 
of the Member State – of the installation’s actual emissions in a year t. (17) 
requires that the total expected emissions are accounted for either through 
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emission credits (EUAs, CERs) or through emission abatement. (18) is again a 
simplification that prohibits the selling of the credits. 
 
4.7.4 Yes Linking Yes Banking 
 
 
 
In the case that linking as well as banking are allowed the objective (19) looks 
similar to (6) but it is extended with the project based credits. In year 1 there are 
no banked credits from the year before that can be used. Thus, the installation’s 
decision is to either pay for actual emissions (using EUAs or CERs) or to reduce 
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its emissions. Starting from the second year, the installation can again decide 
between buying emission credits (EUAs or CERs) and reducing its emissions. 
Additionally it can use EUAs or CERs it banked the year before. On the whole, 
each installation will want to minimize its total costs, as before. Constraint (20), like 
(7), states that the total number of EUAs bought in year t (independent of whether 
they are used in the same year or banked for the next year) cannot exceed the 
total available amount of EUAs in that year. (21) limits the possible abatement 
quantity, depending on the installation’s total abatement potential. (22) states that 
the total number of CERs bought in year t (independent of whether they are used 
in the same year or banked for the next year) cannot exceed the total available 
amount of CERs in that year. (23) limits the total amount of CERs (banked from 
the previous year or bought that very year) that may be used by an installation to 
“pay” for emissions in a year t, by stating that the emission quantity paid for in 
CERs, must not exceed a certain percentage of the installation’s actual emissions 
in a year t. (24) states that the sum of all used emission credits (the ones that were 
banked from the year before and the ones that were bought this year) and the 
abated quantity has to be equal to the installation’s total expected emissions 
minus the emission reductions that were made in previous years but still have an 
effect in year t. This constraint is valid for all years t and all installations i. (25) 
states that in year 1 no banked credits from the year before are available. (26) 
prohibits the selling of credits. 
 
5 Problems of the ETS  
5.1 (Over)Allocation and a Lack of Transparency 
As mentioned above there was an overall surplus of emission certificates on the 
market during Phase I. There are two possible explanations for this: Either, the EU 
ETS was such a success that many installations switched to cleaner fuels. Or 
(which is regarded to be the more likely option), there was an overallocation of 
EUAs. Whatever the reason, observers agree, that if not for the lack of emission 
data, the credit surplus would have been prevented (at least to some extent). 
 
One of the huge advantages of having a learning phase, such as Phase I, is the 
possibility to gain more reliable emission data on the level required. For the 
-104- 
assessment of the NAPs for Phase II the European Commission used the verified 
emission reports of the year 2005 that were published in April 2006. As already 
mentioned, these data of the emissions became the new baseline for the future 
cap setting processes of the European Commission. 
 
The problem with overallocation is that no reasonable price will form. If everybody 
has sufficient allowances, why spend money on abatement? Stern argues that to 
“hold concentrations below 500ppm [parts per million] CO2e successfully, an 
approximate 30 Gt [1 Gt = 1 billion tonnes] cut in annual flows is necessary by 
2030. In a well-functioning market this would require a price of around € 40 per 
tonne of CO2e […]. The current price on the EU ETS (summer 2008), the 
beginning of Phase 2 of the scheme, covering the period 2008-12, is around € 25. 
As ambitions are tightened and we move into Phase 3 (2012-20), a price in the 
region of, or higher than, € 40 per tonne is quite likely.” (Stern 2009, p. 105) 
Concerning the price drop in April 2006 due to the overallocation, Stern writes that 
there are “simple and clear lessons to be learned from this experience. Total 
allocation and the cuts they embody must be transparent and clear. And if prices 
are to drive substantial reductions, then these reductions must be embodied in the 
allocations. In other words, if allocations of rights to emit are too high, then 
reductions in emissions and prices will both be too low – pretty basic economics.” 
(Stern 2009, p.108) 
 
It is often criticised, that the allocation process in Phase I was characterized by a 
dearth of transparency. It is argued that the information used by the Member 
States for the development of their NAPs was more of a guess than verifiable 
data. Since the governments had no choice but to include the affected industries in 
the dialogues concerning emission data and the industries had a strong interest to 
obtain as many (free) EUAs as possible, the overall overallocation was a 
consequence. 
 
5.2 Windfall Profits 
Windfall profits are profits companies make due to unpredictable, favourable 
changes and developments in the market. The industries receive their permits free 
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of charge.  Since they have a value above zero (all trading platforms require a 
minimum tick of at least EUR 0.01), the companies priced-in the certificates at 
their value, the market price. 
 
Especially the energy producing sector, with its characteristic monopolistic 
structure, is able to use the low price elasticity of their consumers, by passing 
through the gained opportunity costs and thus increasing their profits. These 
profits are called windfall profits. 
 
Price increases depend mainly on the elasticity of demand and the company’s 
exposure to international competition. If the demand is highly elastic, i.e. very 
flexible, and if the company is exposed to international competition, the consumers 
will buy the offered product somewhere else, i.e. when one company increases its 
prices, the consumer will buy the product from a different company that offers the 
product cheaper. In this case the possibility of windfall profits is reduced. 
 
Not only the ability to pass through costs has an influence on competition, also the 
opportunity to prevent and mitigate carbon emission plays an important role. If a 
company does not have abatement possibilities, it is more exposed to competition. 
Abatement refers to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, either in quantity 
or in intensity. The electricity industry is considered to be the big winner in this 
case due to their monopolistic structure of the market. ”Electricity companies can 
pass through the costs of permits (so called opportunity costs in case of free 
allocation) to their electricity consumers and thus the higher the permit price and 
the higher the proportion of permits allocated for free, the higher the profits. 
Similarly, traders favour high prices since they receive a share of the transacted 
volume. In addition lower prices might have a negative impact on future allocations 
for 2008-2012, which are negotiated currently,” Betz (2006) explained in 2006.  
 
Ellerman states that "in the short-run, electricity demand is famously inelastic and 
it is not too much of an exaggeration to represent short-run demand as a vertical 
line that moves back and forth along an upward-sloping supply or dispatch curve, 
according to temperature, time of day and other vagaries of electricity demand." 
(Ellerman 2006) Grubb and Neuhoff estimate that “in countries with liberalized 
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power markets, generators have passed through most of the opportunity costs, as 
expected, with aggregate profits totalling billions of euros.”  (Grubb and Neuhoff 
2006) Sijm et al. calculated that empirical and model findings showed that “with 
confidence of about 80 percent, we can say that these [CO2 cost pass through] 
rates are within the interval of 60 and 117 percent [for wholesale power markets] in 
Germany and between 64 and 81 percent in the Netherlands [in the years 2005 
and 2006].” But one must not forget, that “besides the CO2 cost pass through the 
rising peak and load prices in the Netherlands over this period [January to 
September 2005] – from about 52 to 80 €/MWh – are largely due to other factors, 
especially the rising gas prices.”  They conclude, that “looking at the overall picture 
[…] market participants in Germany have fully passed through the opportunity 
costs of CO2 allowances in the spot market,” leading to windfall profits between 
€5.3 and 7.7 billion. (Sijm et al. 2006) 
 
There have been discussions to establish governmental measures to reduce 
windfall profits by introducing e.g. a windfall profit tax, but up to now this has not 
happened. As soon as the free (grandfathering and benchmarking) allocation 
methods are history, so will the windfall profits, since the companies then have to 
buy their allowances on the market at the market price with no value transfer they 
can use as additional gain. These additional profits of the companies seem unfair 
towards the consumers, but Frondel et al. note that “price increases of electricity 
are even desirable from an economic and environmental perspective, as this 
induces consumers to reduce their demand for electricity.” (Frondel et al. 2008) 
This view, that energy consumption prices should be higher, is shared by the IEA, 
which believes that “removing subsidies on energy consumption, which amounted 
to a staggering $310 billion in the 20 largest non-OECD countries in 2007, could 
make a major contribution to curbing demand and emission growths.” (IEA 2008) 
 
5.3 High Complexity and Low Harmonisation 
In a Memo the European Commission calls the attention to the need for further 
harmonisation, as it argues that "besides underlining the need for verified data, 
experience so far has shown that greater harmonisation within the EU ETS is 
imperative to ensure that the EU achieves its emissions reductions objectives at 
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least cost and with minimal competitive distortions. The need for more 
harmonisation is clearest with respect to how the cap on overall emission 
allowances is set." (European Commission 2008b) Since the European 
Commission offered guidelines for the development of the NAPs instead of rules, 
each country has its own way of allocating. This, it is argued, harms competition 
between the 27 Member States. There are no standardized rules on new entrants, 
transfers and closures. The high complexity of the different set of rules – not only 
between the Member States, but also within them – makes it difficult for all 
involved in the market.  
 
A higher degree of harmonisation concerning the definitions of the installations 
and sectors covered by the scheme, as well as the allocation procedure would 
reduce the complexity of the scheme. This in turn would reduce the 
administrational costs of the authorities in charge. Lack of harmonisation across 
the Member States covered, also leads to competition distortions, as installations 
that fall under the EU ETS in one Member State, may not be obliged to participate 
in another. Ellerman and Joskow argue that harmonisation is difficult to achieve 
and “unlikely since differences in national circumstance, such as those between 
the West and East European member states, will likely lead to some differentiation 
of national burdens and resulting differences in allocations to individual 
installations.” (Ellerman and Joskow 2008) 
  
5.4 High Transaction Costs 
Participating operators are confronted with high transaction costs. These 
transaction costs are costs for monitoring, reporting and verification of emissions, 
registry fees, broker fees, administrational fees, and so on. The registry-related 
fees include an opening and a yearly maintenance fee, a fee for the allocation 
decision and a fee for the permit issuance and updating. 
 
The Member States have freedom of choice regarding the level of charges and 
fees they impose for the use of the EU ETS. The revenues are used to recover the 
costs of the EU ETS. The EEA found that in 2007 “many Member States 
substantially increased the fees and charges for the use of the national registry” 
-108- 
compared to the year before. (EEA 2008b) The participating companies thus not 
only have to deal with the costs for the actual EUAs as additional costs, but also 
with charges and fees for the use of the EU ETS. These charges and fees differ 
greatly between the Member States. Open Europe calculated the administrational 
costs and found, that especially compared to a tax, the administration of a trading 
scheme is very complicated and pricey. “The estimates in the UK Government’s 
preliminary Regulatory Impact Assessment suggest that this administrative burden 
[additional costs for monitoring staff, compliance activities, emission verification 
costs,…] is costing firms and public sector bodies approximately £62 million 
[around EUR 91 million] a year in the UK.” Open Europe concludes, that “even a 
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the EU’s ETS is far from being the 
most cost effective way to reduce net carbon emissions. Adding up simply the 
transfer cost and the administrative cost suggests a cost to the UK economy of 
£530 million [around EUR 779 million] a year (without including the knock-on costs 
of higher energy prices).” (Open Europe 2006) 
 
Some Member States suggested rethinking the inclusion of small installations in 
the EU ETS, as those are especially exposed to the heavy burden of 
administrational costs for using the scheme, while not contributing to a significant 
emission reduction. 
 
 
Figure 21 Share of number of installations and emissions by size of installation (kt CO2), 
average 2005-200737 
                                                     
37 Taken from EEA Homepage 2009d 
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 Figure 21 shows the share of number of installations and emissions by size of 
installation (kt CO2 [1kt=1000t]), average 2005-2007. The installations are rated 
according to their emission outputs: 
• zero: emitters with verified zero emissions 
• mini: emitters below 500 tonnes CO2/year 
• small: emitters of 500 to 50.000 tonnes CO2/year 
• medium: emitters of 50.000 to 500.000 tonnes CO2/year  
• large: emitters over 500.000 tonnes CO2/year 
 
Lowering the threshold level of emissions to relieve small installations by excluding 
them from or giving them the possibility to opt-out of the trading scheme as a 
whole may be the wrong measure. This step would jeopardize the emission goals. 
It might be more preferable to apply lower administration tariffs for smaller 
installations or to develop a reimbursement system for installations under a certain 
threshold. Buchner et al. deal with the sensibility of the 20 MW threshold and find 
that “while the inclusion of small installations required more time and effort than 
would appear to be justified by their emission or abatement potential, the 
alternatives are not obvious. The problem with any size threshold is that it has the 
potential to create a competitive disadvantage for covered installations and a 
perverse incentive to downsize in order to avoid regulation. And the higher the 
threshold, the greater these problems are likely to be." (Buchner et al. 2006) - The 
European Commission has forbidden opt-outs starting from Phase II. 
 
5.5 Short Trading Periods 
Another problem is that the trading periods are regarded to be rather short. Phase 
I has a duration of three years (2005-2007) and Phase II has a duration of five 
years (2008-2012). For investment decisions this is considered to be very short, 
when the EUA are seen as an asset of the company, especially in the industries 
that participate in the trading scheme. The European Commission is against an 
expansion of the trading periods to at least a decade, as suggested by the 
industries. It maintains that an expansion would lead to a stand-still of climate 
change policies because all action against climate change would be postponed to 
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the end of the trading period. Lessons and experiences would have to wait 
accordingly longer. Due to the tight deadlines of the Kyoto targets this is 
unacceptable for Phase I and Phase II. As for Phase III, the European 
Commission wants to encourage long-term emission reductions, and thus 
proposed that the subsequent Phase, Phase III, will run for eight years, 2013-
2020.  
 
5.6 Narrow Scope 
The inclusion of further greenhouse gases and sectors covered by the scheme are 
frequently discussed. Especially the inclusion of transportation and civil aviation, 
two sectors that are responsible for high percentages (about 18 per cent 
transportation, 2 per cent aviation of total EU-27 greenhouse gas emissions) of 
CO2 emissions, with an increasing tendency, are only a question of time. 
  
The European Commission’s works on including aviation in the scheme, for 
instance, started in the end of 2005 (European Commission 2006c). Civil aviation 
will be included in the scheme by 2012. The “Aviation Directive” states that for the 
remainder of Phase II, the calendar year 2012, “the total quantity of allowances to 
be allocated to aircraft operators shall be equivalent to 97% of the historical 
emissions.”  (European Parliament 2008) This means that from January 1, 2012, 
all flights which arrive at or depart from airports in EU ETS participating countries 
will need EUAs to cover their emissions. 
 
It is also proposed to include “installations undertaking the capture, transport and 
geological storage of greenhouse gases; CO2 emissions from the petrochemicals, 
ammonia and aluminium sectors; nitrous oxide emissions from the production of 
nitric, adipic and glyoxylic acid; and perfluorocarbon emissions from aluminium 
production” from 2013. These measures would extend the coverage of EU’s total 
greenhouse gas emissions from 40 per cent to 43 per cent. (European 
Commission 2008a) 
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5.7 State Aid  
The low degree of harmonisation (different allocation methods used, the different 
definitions of who is to participate in the scheme, the different allocation rules, etc.) 
automatically leads to competition distortions, which can be seen as state aid. 
Criterion 5 of Annex III of the “Emission Directive” prohibits state aid, as it declares 
that the NAP “shall not discriminate between companies and sectors in such a way 
as to unduly favour certain undertakings or activities in accordance with the 
requirements of the [European Community] Treaty, in particular Articles 87 and 88 
thereof.” In Article 87(1) of the European Community Treaty state aid is prohibited: 
“Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to 
distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain 
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible 
with the common market.” Article 87(3)c makes an exemption to the state aid rules 
concerning environmental aid. If “the development of certain activities [is 
facilitated] without affecting trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common 
interest” the exemption is allowed. What exactly is meant by that has to be 
decided individually for each case. The “Guidance Paper”, published in 2004, does 
not clarify what has to be considered, but just provides a curt: “normal state aid 
rules will apply,” when dealing with the subject. In 2005 the European Commission 
illustrated in a Communication that “state aid should only be used when it is an 
appropriate instrument for meeting a well defined objective when it creates the 
right incentives, is proportionate and when it distorts competition to the least 
possible extent. For that reason, appreciating the compatibility of state aid is 
fundamentally about balancing the negative effects of aid on competition with its 
positive effects in terms of common interest.” (European Commission 2005c) De 
Sepibus offers a detailed analysis on this topic and sums up: “The Commission’s 
assessment of the NAPs with respect to the rules on State aid is, without doubt, 
unsatisfactory. Poorly reasoned and stressing the provisional character of its 
decisions, the Commission’s practice upset many stakeholders.” (de Sepibus 
2007b) 
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5.8 Hot Air 
Many Eastern European countries offer very cheap abatement possibilities. The 
reason is that today these countries are below their Kyoto target due to their 
economic collapse in the 1990s that occurred after the fall of the Soviet empire. 
They now have many surplus emission allowances they can sell, since they do not 
need them for themselves, so-called “hot air”. If these hot-air-permits enter the 
market, they will drive down the price and jeopardize the functionality of the 
system, since scarcity is a necessity for the price to stay at a level that promotes 
mitigation. Duerr explains hot air as “ironic expression for emission allowances 
from countries considered over equipped with emission rights. This is because the 
national emissions of all Annex B countries under the Kyoto Protocol were 
calculated based on 1990 levels. When the Eastern European economies 
collapsed in the 1990s, their emission levels dropped sharply. As a result, many of 
these countries hold a considerable surplus of emission rights. Russia and 
Ukraine, in particular, hold hundreds of millions of unused emission allowances. 
Fears abound that if these countries put their rights on certificate markets, supply 
would vastly outnumber demand and result in a price crash for emission 
certificates. This would severely damage the emission trading system as it works 
only under the assumption of scarcity.” (Duerr 2007) 
 
6 Summary 
On January 1, 2005 the EU ETS was launched. It is a multinational emission 
trading system helping participating countries to reach their Kyoto targets. The first 
three years after its implementation was Phase I, a learning phase offering a trial-
and-error approach for the following compliance period. Despite its weaknesses 
and the many obstacles and problems along the path from development to 
realization, most critics agreed that it is a success. Buchner et al. state “within less 
than five years, the EU ETS evolved from being an innovative but controversial 
idea to an indispensable instrument of European climate change policy.” (Buchner 
et al. 2007) Ellerman and Joskow have praise for the EU ETS that ”has evolved 
from being an engaging possibility in the 2000 Green Paper to being what is now 
regularly characterized as the flagship of the European Climate Change Program.” 
(Ellerman and Joskow 2008) 
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 When the idea of a cap-and-trade system with cost-free allowance allocation first 
arose, opponents claimed that taxes were better measures, as they are direct 
costs per emitted unit, while the EU ETS gave heavily air polluting companies 
permission to emit. When the “Emission Directive” was issued, it was criticised, 
that the scheme did not limit, “cap”, the total amount of allowances it would grant, 
but that the Member States had to make sure for themselves to move within the 
limits the criteria in Annex III of the “Emission Directive” set. As a consequence, 
the “Emission Directive” was amended for future trading phases. In a Memo the 
European Commission writes that the final text of the amended “Emission 
Directive” differed a bit from the proposal. Nevertheless, had the "climate and 
energy trends agreed by the 2007 Spring European Council been maintained and 
the overall architecture of the Commission's proposal on the EU ETS remains 
intact. That is to say that there will be one EU-wide cap on the number of emission 
allowances and this cap will decrease annually along a linear trend line, which will 
continue beyond the end of the third trading periods (2013-2020)." (European 
Commission 2008b) 
 
An often discussed topic is the sensibility of the prohibition of banking, the saving 
of emission credits for the future, during Phase I. While it did have a negative 
effect on price stability (as the credits became worthless with the termination of the 
trading period), I believe that in the case of the EU ETS it was justified. Due to the 
lack of verified emission data, the release of saved credits would have had a 
devastating effect on the current prices. According to several studies a price of 
EUR 40 per emission allowance would be needed to motivate abatement. With an 
already low market price, the increase in supply (by letting unused credits from the 
former phase enter the market), would have forced down the prices even further. 
 
One of the main topics found in the literature on Phase I is the lack of data and 
experience that caused uncertainty among the players, resulting in high price 
volatility and (in the beginning) reserved market participation. Accessibility of 
information has an influence on the efficiency of the market and the Member 
States had to cope with many imponderables. The allocation process was full of 
unanswered questions concerning the rules of the system and irregularities that 
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were only intensified by the tight deadlines. But I believe that exactly these tight 
deadlines brought the necessary impetus for action.  
 
Without a doubt there are many controversial points and the EU ETS still has an 
optimisation potential, but on the whole I believe that the challenge of getting a 
trading system of its size up and running in such a short time period, should not be 
underestimated. After many years of consulting and evaluating, something is 
finally being done. A fact the IEA (2008) acknowledges, as it writes: ”It is within the 
power of all governments, of producing and consuming countries alike, acting 
alone or together, to steer the world towards a cleaner, cleverer and more 
competitive energy system. Time is running out and the time to act is now.” 
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Annex 
 
Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
 
Am ersten Jänner 2005 wurde der Handel mit Emissionszertifikaten begonnen. Es 
handelt sich um ein multinationales System das den am Emissionshandel 
teilnehmenden Staaten helfen soll, ihre Kyoto-Verpflichtungen zu erfüllen. Die 
ersten drei Jahre nach der Implementation war Phase I, eine Lernphase zu 
Versuchszwecken für die folgende Verpflichtungsphase. Trotz seiner Schwächen 
und der zahlreichen Herausforderungen und Probleme im Lauf von der 
Entwicklung zur Realisierung sind sich die meisten Kritiker, dass es ein Erfolg 
geworden ist.. Buchner et al. sagen “innerhalb von weniger als fünf Jahren hat 
sich der Emissions-Zertifikatehandel der EU von einer innovativen, aber 
kontroversiellen Idee zum einem unverzichtbaren Instrument der europäischen 
Klimapolitik entwickelt.” (Buchner et al. 2007) Ellerman und Joskow loben den  
Emissions-Zertifikatehandel der EU mit den Worten, als ”.. hat sich von einer 
ambitionierten Möglichkeit im Green Paper des Jahres 2000 zum Flaggschiff der 
europäischen Klimapolitik entwickelt.” (Ellerman and Joskow 2008) 
 
Als die Idee eines Cap-and-Trade Systems mit kostenlosen Emissionsquoten 
erstmals vorgestellt wurde, haben seine Gegner Emissionssteuern als die bessere 
Maßnahme erachtet, weil diese direkte Kosten pro Emissionsmenge wären, 
während die Emissionszertifikate Unternehmen mit großen Emissionen diese 
Emissionen de facto zugestehen. Als die Emissionsdirektive in Kraft trat wurde 
kritisiert, dass sie die zugestandenen Emissionen nicht limitierte (“cap”), sondern 
den Mitgliedsstaaten Freiheiten bei der Festsetzung der Limits im Rahmen der 
Grenzen des Annex III der Emissionsdirektive einräumte. In der Folge wurde die 
Emissionsdirektive für künftige Handelsperioden erweitert. Ein Memo der 
Europäischen Kommission besagt, dass der endgültige Text der erweiterten 
Emissionsdirektive vom ursprünglichen Vorschlag ein wenig abgewichen war. 
Trotzdem seien die Klima- und Energietrends, die in der Frühlingssitzung 2007 
des Europäischen Rates festgelegt wurden, und das gesamte Konzept des 
Vorschlages der Kommission zur Emissionsdirektive erhalten geblieben. Das heißt 
-125- 
es wird eine europaweit gültige Limitierung der Emissionsquoten geben und das 
Limit wird bis über das Ende des dritten Handelszeitraumes (2013-2020) hinaus 
jährlich einem linearen Trend folgend reduziert. (European Commission 2008b) 
 
Ein häufig diskutiertes Thema ist das Verbot des Bankings, d.h. das Ansparen von 
Emissionszertifikaten in Phase I für spätere Perioden. Zwar hatte das Verbot einen 
negativen Effekt auf die Preisstabilität, weil die Zertifikate am Ende der 
Handelsperiode wertlos wurden. Meines Erachtens ist diese Haltung im Falle des 
Emissionshandels gerechtfertigt. Wegen dem Mangel an verifizierbaren 
Emissionsdaten hätte die Ausgabe von angesparten Zertifikaten zu einem 
Preisverfall geführt. Auf Grundlage mehrerer Studien wäre ein Preis von EUR 40 
pro Emissionseinheit notwendig gewesen, um eine Reduzierung der Emissionen 
zu motivieren. Bei einem bereits anfänglich niedrigen Marktpreis wäre durch die 
Erhöhung des Angebots durch die Akzeptanz von ungenutzten Quoten aus 
früheren Perioden der Preis weiter verfallen. 
 
Eines der bestimmenden Themen in der Fachliteratur ist, dass in Phase I 
mangelnde Erfahrung und fehlende Datengrundlagen zu Unsicherheiten bei den 
Marktteilnehmern geführt haben, die zu einer hohen Volatilität des Preises und zur 
Zurückhaltung bei der Teilnahme am Markt geführt haben. Der Zugang zu 
Informationen hat die Effizienz des Marktes beeinflusst und die Mitgliedsstaaten 
hatten mit Unwägbarkeiten umzugehen. Viele Fragen über die Regen der 
Verteilung der Zertifikate waren unbeantwortet und Inkonsistenzen wurden durch 
die eng gesetzten Termine verstärkt. Ich bin aber überzeugt, dass gerade dieser 
Termindruck die Sache vorangetrieben hat.  
 
Zweifellos sind viele Aspekte des Europäischen Handels mit Emissionszertifikaten 
kontroversiell und das gesamte System kann noch vielfach optimiert werden. 
Dennoch muss anerkannt werden, dass ein System von beachtlicher Größe in 
sehr kurzer Zeit auf die Beine gestellt worden ist. Nach vielen Jahren der Beratung 
und der Bewertung wurde endlich Initiative ergriffen. Dies betont auch die IEA 
(2008) wenn geschrieben wird: ”Es liegt in der Macht der Regierungen, sowohl 
von produzierenden als auch konsumierenden Ländern, in Einzelaktivitäten oder 
in gemeinsamem Handeln, die Welt zu einem saubereren, klügeren und 
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kompetitiveren Energieversorgungssystem zu leiten. Die Zeit wird knapp und es ist 
jetzt Zeit zu handeln.” 
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